Abstract
In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called P2.1 r, that is based on Goble’s logic SDL a P e—a bimodal extension of Goble’s logic P that invalidates aggregation for all prima facie obligations. The logic P2.1 r has several advantages with respect to SDL a P e. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation “as much as possible”. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than SDL a P e. The logic P2.1 r avoids Goble’s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the ‘toy examples’ from the literature as well as more complex ones.
Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO - Vlaanderen). The authors are indebted to the three anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions.
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Meheus, J., Beirlaen, M., Van De Putte, F. (2010). Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation. In: Governatori, G., Sartor, G. (eds) Deontic Logic in Computer Science. DEON 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6181. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14183-6_12
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