Abstract
In the probabilistic non-repudiation protocol without a trusted third party as presented in [5], the recipient of a service can cheat the originator of the service with some probability. This probability indicates the degree of fairness of the protocol and is referred as ε-fairness. In this paper, we analyze the protocol quantitatively through probabilistic model checking. The ε-fairness is quantitatively measured by modeling the protocol in PRISM model checker and verifying appropriate property specified in PCTL. Moreover, our analysis gives proper insight to choose proper values for different parameters associated with the protocol in such a way that certain degree of fairness can be achieved and therefore answers the reverse question, given the degree of fairness ε, how should one choose the protocol parameters to ensure fairness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aldini, A., Gorrieri, R.: Security analysis of a probabilistic non-repudiation protocol. In: Hermanns, H., Segala, R. (eds.) PROBMIV 2002, PAPM-PROBMIV 2002, and PAPM 2002. LNCS, vol. 2399, pp. 17–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Aldini, A., Di Pierro, A.: On Quantitative Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols. In: Proc. 2nd Workshop on Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (QAPL 2004). ENTCS, vol. 112, pp. 131–148 (2004)
Hinton, A., Kwiatkowska, M., Norman, G., Parker, D.: PRISM: A tool for automatic verification of probabilistic systems. In: Hermanns, H., Palsberg, J. (eds.) TACAS 2006. LNCS, vol. 3920, pp. 441–444. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Kremer, S., Raskin, J.-F.: A game-based verification of non-repudiation and fair exchange protocols. In: Larsen, K.G., Nielsen, M. (eds.) CONCUR 2001. LNCS, vol. 2154, p. 551. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Markowitch, O., Roggeman, Y.: Probabilistic non-repudiation without trusted third party. In: Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Security in Communication Networks (1999)
Lanotte, R., Maggiolo-schettini, A., Troina, A.: Automatic Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol. In: Proceedings of QAPL 2004. Elsevier ENTCS, pp. 113–129 (2004)
Zhou, J., Gollman, D.: Observations on non-repudiation. In: Kim, K.-c., Matsumoto, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1163, pp. 133–144. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Saha, I., Mukhopadhyay, D. (2009). Quantitative Analysis of a Probabilistic Non-repudiation Protocol through Model Checking. In: Prakash, A., Sen Gupta, I. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5905. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_22
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10772-6_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10771-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10772-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)