Abstract
Fully decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) systems do not have a central control mechanism. Thus, different forms of control mechanisms are required to deal with selfish peers. One type of selfish behavior is the consumption of resources without providing sufficient resources. Therefore, incentive schemes encourage peers to share resources while punishing selfish peers. A well-known example of an incentive scheme is Tit-for-Tat (TFT), as used in BitTorrent. With this scheme, a peer can only consume as much resources as it provides. TFT is resilient to collusion due to relying on private histories only. However, TFT can only be applied to peers with direct reciprocity.
This paper presents a private and shared history (PSH) based incentive mechanism, which supports transitive relations (indirect reciprocity). Furthermore, it is resilient to collusion and it combines private and shared histories in an efficient manner. The PSH approach uses a shared history for identifying transitive relations. Those relations are verified using private histories. Simulations show that the PSH mechanism has a higher transaction success ratio than TFT.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Adar, E., Huberman, B.A.: Free Riding on Gnutella. First Monday, Internet Journal 5(10) (October 2000)
Cohen, B.: Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent. In: Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, Berkeley, CA, USA (June 2003)
Donato, D., Paniccia, M., Selis, M., Castillo, C., Cortese, G., Leonardi, S.: New Metrics for Reputation Management in P2P Networks. Technical report, Banff, Alberta, Canada (May 2007)
Douceur, J.R.: The sybil attack. In: IPTPS 2001: Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, London, UK, pp. 251–260. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Feldman, M., Lai, K., Stoica, I., Chuang, J.: Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks. In: EC 2004: Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pp. 102–111. ACM Press, New York (2004)
Hausheer, D.: PeerMart: Secure Decentralized Pricing and Accounting for Peer-to-Peer Systems, Number 16200. Shaker Verlag, Aachen, Germany (2006)
Hausheer, D., Stiller, B.: PeerMint: Decentralized and Secure Accounting for Peer-to-Peer Applications. In: IFIP Networking Conference, Ontario, Canada, May 2005, pp. 40–52 (2005)
Kamvar, S.D., Schlosser, M.T., Garcia-Molina, H.: The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks. In: WWW 2003: Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web, pp. 640–651. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Lian, Q., Peng, Y., Yang, M., Zhang, Z., Dai, Y., Li, X.: Robust Incentives via Multi-level Tit-for-tat. In: 5th Int. Workshop on Peerto-Peer Systems (IPTPS), Santa Barbara, CA, USA (February 2006)
Marti, S., Molina, H.G.: Limited Reputation Sharing in P2P Systems. In: 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2004), pp. 91–101. ACM Press, New York (2004)
Nielson, S.J., Crosby, S., Wallach, D.S.: A Taxonomy of Rational Attacks. In: Castro, M., van Renesse, R. (eds.) IPTPS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3640. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Obreiter, P., Nimis, J.: A Taxonomy of Incentive Patterns - The Design Space of Incentives for Cooperation. In: Moro, G., Sartori, C., Singh, M.P. (eds.) AP2PC 2003. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 2872. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Shneidman, J., Parkes, D.C.: Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks. In: Kaashoek, M.F., Stoica, I. (eds.) IPTPS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2735. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Wallach, D.S., Ngan, T.-W., Druschel, P.: Enforcing Fair Sharing of Peer-to-Peer Resources. In: 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS), Berkeley, California (February 2003)
Vishnumurthy, V., Chandrakumar, S., Sirer, E.: KARMA: A Secure Economic Framework for Peer-to-Peer Resource Sharing. In: Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, Berkeley, CA, USA (June 2003)
Xiong, L., Liu, L.: Peertrust: supporting reputation-based trust for peer-to-peer electronic communities. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 16(7), 843–857 (2004)
Yang, B., Garcia-Molina, H.: PPay: Micropayments for Peer-to-Peer Systems. In: CCS 2003: Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pp. 300–310. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Yang, M., Chen, H., Zhao, B.Y., Dai, Y., Zhang, Z.: Deployment of a large-scale peer-to-peer social network, Boston, MA, USA (June 2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing
About this paper
Cite this paper
Bocek, T., Kun, W., Hecht, F.V., Hausheer, D., Stiller, B. (2008). PSH: A Private and Shared History-Based Incentive Mechanism. In: Hausheer, D., Schönwälder, J. (eds) Resilient Networks and Services. AIMS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5127. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70587-1_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70587-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-70586-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70587-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)