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Efficient One-Round Key Exchange in the Standard Model

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5107))

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Abstract

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia

    Colin Boyd, Yvonne Cliff & Juan Gonzalez Nieto

  2. Information Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, U.K.

    Kenneth G. Paterson

Authors
  1. Colin Boyd
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  2. Yvonne Cliff
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  3. Juan Gonzalez Nieto
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  4. Kenneth G. Paterson
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Yi Mu Willy Susilo Jennifer Seberry

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Boyd, C., Cliff, Y., Gonzalez Nieto, J., Paterson, K.G. (2008). Efficient One-Round Key Exchange in the Standard Model. In: Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5107. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69971-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70500-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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