Abstract
In this manuscript, two key agreement protocols which are resistant to a denial-of-service attack are constructed from a key agreement protocol in [9] provably secure against passive and active attacks. The denial-of-service attack considered is the resource-exhaustion attack on a responder. By the resource-exhaustion attack, a malicious initiator executes a key agreement protocol simultaneously as many times as possible to exhaust the responder’s resources and to disturb executions of it between honest initiators and the responder. The resources are the storage and the CPU. The proposed protocols are the first protocols resistant to both the storage-exhaustion attack and the CPU-exhaustion attack. The techniques used in the construction are stateless connection, weak key confirmation, and enforcement of heavy computation. The stateless connection is effective to enhancing the resistance to the storage-exhaustion attack. The weak key confirmation and the enforcement of heavy computation are effective to enhancing the resistance to the CPU-exhaustion attack.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aura, T., Nikander, P.: Stateless connections. In: Han, Y., Quing, S. (eds.) ICICS 1997. LNCS, vol. 1334, pp. 87–97. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 62–73 (1993)
Blake-Wilson, S., Johnson, D., Menezes, A.: Key agreement protocols and their security analysis. In: Darnell, M.J. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 1997. LNCS, vol. 1355, pp. 30–45. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Infor. Theory IT-22, 644–654 (1976)
Diffie, W., van Oorschot, P.C., Wiener, M.J.: Authentication and authenticated key exchanges. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 2(2), 107–125 (1992)
Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 139–147. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
ElGamal, T.: A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-31(4), 469–472 (1985)
Harkins, D., Carrel, D.: The internet key exchange (IKE). RFC2409 (1998)
Hirose, S., Yoshida, S.: An authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol secure against active attacks. In: Imai, H., Zheng, Y. (eds.) PKC 1998. LNCS, vol. 1431, pp. 135–148. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Just, M., Vaudenay, S.: Authenticated multi-party key agreement. In: Kim, K.-c., Matsumoto, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1163, pp. 36–49. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Karn, P., Simpson, W.: Photuris: Session-key management protocol. RFC2522 (1999)
Law, L., Menezes, A., Qu, M., Solinas, J., Vanstone, S.: An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement. Technical Report CORR98-05, Department of C&O, University of Waterloo (1998)
Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 239–252. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Hirose, S., Matsuura, K. (1999). Enhancing the Resistance of a Provably Secure Key Agreement Protocol to a Denial-of-Service Attack. In: Varadharajan, V., Mu, Y. (eds) Information and Communication Security. ICICS 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1726. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-47942-0_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-47942-0_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-66682-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47942-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive