Abstract
In this paper we study the anonymity provided by generalized mixes that insert dummy traffic. Mixes are an essential component to offer anonymous email services. We indicate how to compute the recipient and sender anonymity and we point out some problems that may arise from the intuitive extension of the metric to take into account dummies. Two possible ways of inserting dummy traffic are discussed and compared. An active attack scenario is considered, and the anonymity provided by mixes under the attack is analyzed.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Díaz, C., Preneel, B. (2004). Reasoning About the Anonymity Provided by Pool Mixes That Generate Dummy Traffic. In: Fridrich, J. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3200. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30114-1_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30114-1_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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