Abstract
This paper presents algebraic attacks on SOBER-t32 and SOBER-t16 without stuttering. For unstuttered SOBER-t32, two different attacks are implemented. In the first attack, we obtain multivariate equations of degree 10. Then, an algebraic attack is developed using a collection of output bits whose relation to the initial state of the LFSR can be described by low-degree equations. The resulting system of equations contains 269 equations and monomials, which can be solved using the Gaussian elimination with the complexity of 2196.5. For the second attack, we build a multivariate equation of degree 14. We focus on the property of the equation that the monomials which are combined with output bit are linear. By applying the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, we can obtain a system of linear equations and the initial states of the LFSR can be recovered. The complexity of attack is around O(2100) with 292 keystream observations. The second algebraic attack is applicable to SOBER-t16 without stuttering. The attack takes around O(285) CPU clocks with 278 keystream observations.
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Cho, J.Y., Pieprzyk, J. (2004). Algebraic Attacks on SOBER-t32 and SOBER-t16 without Stuttering. In: Roy, B., Meier, W. (eds) Fast Software Encryption. FSE 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3017. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25937-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-25937-4_4
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