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Very Short Intermittent DDoS Attacks in an Unsaturated System

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Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2017)

Abstract

We present a new class of low-volume application layer DDoS attack–Very Short Intermittent DDoS (VSI-DDoS). Such attack sends intermittent bursts (tens of milliseconds duration) of legitimate HTTP requests to the target website with the goal of degrading the quality of service (QoS) of the system and damaging the long-term business of the service provider. VSI-DDoS attacks can be especially stealthy since they can significantly impair the target system performance while the average usage rate of all the system resources is at a moderate level, making it hard to pinpoint the root-cause of performance degradation. We develop a framework to effectively launch VSI-DDoS attacks, which includes three phases: the profiling phase in which appropriate HTTP requests are selected to launch the attack, the training phase in which a typical Service Level Agreement (e.g., \(95^{th}\) percentile response time <1 s) is used to train the attack parameters, and the attacking phase in which attacking scripts are generated and deployed to distributed bots to launch the actual attack. To evaluate such VSI-DDoS attacks, we conduct extensive experiments using a representative benchmark web application under realistic cloud scaling settings and equipped with some popular state-of-the-art IDS/IPS systems (e.g., Snort), and find that our attacks are able to effectively cause the long-tail latency problem of the benchmark website while escaping the radar of those DDoS defense tools.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Low utilization is to rule out the queueing effect inside the target system.

  2. 2.

    Short L leads to high instant request rate \(V\text {/}L\), OS kernel may not be able to handle packets promptly due to high overhead of interrupt handling [18].

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Acknowledgement

This research has been partially funded by National Science Foundation by CISE’s CNS (1566443, 1566388), Louisiana Board of Regents under grant LEQSF (2015-18)-RD-A-11, and gifts, grants, or contracts from Fujitsu. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or other funding agencies and companies mentioned above.

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Correspondence to Qingyang Wang .

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© 2018 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Shan, H., Wang, Q., Yan, Q. (2018). Very Short Intermittent DDoS Attacks in an Unsaturated System. In: Lin, X., Ghorbani, A., Ren, K., Zhu, S., Zhang, A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2017. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 238. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_3

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