Abstract
Distances have a major role in voting theory. They can determine the outcome of an election or ways to influence elections via manipulation or bribery. In the first part of this abstract, previotus results concerning distance-based committee election rules are summarized, while current research questions are introduced in the second part.
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Rey, L. (2017). Distances in Voting and Committee Election Rules for General Preference Types. In: Rothe, J. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10576. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_31
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