Abstract
Much of the practical work conducted to minimise risk of human error and loss of human reliability, at least in oil and gas, chemicals and other process industries over the past 30 or so years, has been based on the model of basic error types known as the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS). Over roughly the same period, psychologists and behavioural economists, have developed a rich understanding of the nature and characteristics of what, in simplified terms, are widely considered to be two styles of thinking – often referred to as “System 1” and “System 2”. This paper explores the relationship between the GEMS model and what is known of the functioning of the two styles of thinking, and in particular the characteristics and biases associated with System 1 thinking. While many of the ideas behind the two styles of thinking are embedded in the GEMS model, there are some important omissions.
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McLeod, R.W. (2018). From Reason and Rasmussen to Kahneman and Thaler: Styles of Thinking and Human Reliability in High Hazard Industries. In: Boring, R. (eds) Advances in Human Error, Reliability, Resilience, and Performance. AHFE 2017. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 589. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60645-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60645-3_11
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