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Transposition of AES Key Schedule

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Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10143))

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Abstract

In this paper, we target the poor diffusion pattern in the key schedule of AES. More specifically, the column-by-column word-wise property in the key schedule matches closely with the MixColumns operation in the round diffusion, which leads to several attacks in both single-key and related-key model. Therefore, we propose a new key schedule by switching the interaction from between different columns to between different rows, which offers stronger security than the original AES key schedule and better efficiency than other key schedule proposals. First, our proposal reduces the number of rounds of several single-key attacks, such as popular SQUARE attacks and meet-in-the-middle attacks, e.g. Derbez et al., EUROCYRPT 2013 and Li et al., FSE 2014. Meanwhile, it increases the security margin for AES in the related-key model, namely making the related-key differential attacks with local collisions which broke the full rounds of AES impossible.

Compared with the original key schedule, our modification is slight and just does a transposition on the output matrix of the subkeys. Compared with other AES key schedule variants, no extra non-linear operations, no complicated diffusion method, and no complicated iteration process of generating subkeys exist in our modification.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61272440, 61472251, U1536101), China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2013M531174, 2014T70417), and Science and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Jialin Huang

  2. Cryptography and Information Security Lab, Department of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Hailun Yan & Xuejia Lai

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  1. Jialin Huang
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  2. Hailun Yan
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  3. Xuejia Lai
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Correspondence to Xuejia Lai .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Science, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China

    Kefei Chen

  2. Institute of Information Engineering, SKLOIS, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  3. Snapchat Inc., Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Huang, J., Yan, H., Lai, X. (2017). Transposition of AES Key Schedule. In: Chen, K., Lin, D., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_6

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