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Language-Based Hypervisors

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Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10052))

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Abstract

We describe how to build a Language-Based Hypervisor (LBH) that can run untrusted applications (or modules) inside secure containers within a single language runtime instance. The LBH allows execution of untrusted code at a fine-grained level while controlling access to APIs, data, and resources. The LBH and untrusted applications are written in the same language and run together as one process on top of a single language interpreter or runtime. We use JavaScript as an example and describe how LBH can be implemented at the language level without modification to the runtime itself.

In memoriam of Enrico, who passed away after this work, done as an intern at Intel.

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References

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Correspondence to Richard Chow .

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG

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Budianto, E., Chow, R., Ding, J., McCool, M. (2016). Language-Based Hypervisors. In: Foresti, S., Persiano, G. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10052. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_52

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_52

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-48964-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-48965-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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