Abstract
In a verifiable computation (VC) scheme, a client asks a server to perform some outsourced computations, and the latter returns the results as its response. The results can be verified privately or publicly. Fiore and Gennaro (CCS 2012) constructed publicly verifiable protocols for secure outsourcing polynomials and matrix computations. Batch verifiable computation (BVC) schemes allow a client to outsource multiple functions on a same input, and thus much reduce the storage overhead at the server side without sacrificing the efficiency of verification. However, existing BVC schemes only support private verifiability (which only allows the client who outsources the computations to verify the results). In this paper, we propose BVC schemes with public verifiability, i.e., any third party can efficiently verify the results returned by the server without accessing secret key. To delegate s functions, our BVC schemes require a cloud storage of only \(1+1/s\) times the storage size needed by the s functions themselves. We extend our schemes to meet less cloud storage overhead as well.
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Acknowledgements
Yu Yu (corresponding author) was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572192, 61472249, 61572149, 61571191). Xiangxue Li (corresponding author) was supported by Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai Municipality (Grant No. 13JC1403502, 13JC1403500).
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Sun, Y., Yu, Y., Li, X., Zhang, K., Qian, H., Zhou, Y. (2016). Batch Verifiable Computation with Public Verifiability for Outsourcing Polynomials and Matrix Computations. In: Liu, J., Steinfeld, R. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9722. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40253-6_18
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