Abstract
Trust in others transfers between games of strategic interaction (e.g., iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma– PD and Chicken Game – CG). This transfer of trust represents knowledge acquired about the other player (player-specific knowledge), carrying over from one situation to another, which is separate from what was learned about the previous game (game-specific knowledge). We examine how the transfer of both player-specific and game-specific knowledge informs one’s decisions when interacting with a new player. In this paper, we present the experimental design of an upcoming study, where participants will sequentially play two games of strategic interaction (PD & CG) with the same or a different computerized confederate agent. In addition to the experimental design, we present model predictions, using a previously published computational cognitive model of trust dynamics. The model predicts transfer of learning effects in both conditions and larger effects when interacting with the same agent.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
The model has also been made publicly available and can be viewed on http://psych-scholar.wright.edu/astecca/software.
- 2.
Each version of a confederate agent used the same strategy (T4T or PT4T) but each implemented its trustworthiness manipulations, cooperations or defections, on different rounds in a game.
- 3.
All of the model predictions are available on http://psych-scholar.wright.edu/astecca/publications.
References
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K.: Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games Econ. Behav. 10(1), 122–142 (1995)
Yamagishi, T., Kikuchi, M., Kosugi, M.: Trust, gullibility, and social intelligence. Asian J. Soc. Psychol. 2(1), 145–161 (1999)
Yamagishi, T., Kanazawa, S., Mashima, R., Terai, S.: Separating trust from cooperation in a dynamic relationship prisoner’s dilemma with variable dependence. Rationality Soc. 17(3), 275–308 (2005)
Juvina, I., Saleem, M., Martin, J.M., Gonzalez, C., Lebiere, C.: Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 120(2), 206–215 (2013)
Collins, M.G., Juvina, I., Gluck, K.A.: Cognitive model of trust dynamics predicts human behavior within and between two games of strategic interaction with computerized confederate cgents. Front. Psychol. 7(49), 361–370 (2016). doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00049
Juvina, I., Lebiere, C., Gonzalez, C.: Modeling trust dynamics in strategic interaction. J. Appl. Res. Memory Cogn. 4(3), 197–211 (2015)
Cook, K.S., Yamagishi, T., Cheshire, C., Cooper, R., Matsuda, M., Mashima, R.: Trust building via risk taking: A cross-societal experiment. Soc. Psychol. Q. 68(2), 121–142 (2005)
Axelrod, R.: The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York (1984)
Juvina, I., Lebiere, C., Gonzalez, C., Saleem, M.: Intergroup prisoner’s dilemma with intragroup power dynamics and individual power drive. In: Proceeding of Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction, pp. 290–297 (2012)
Anderson, J.R.: How can the human mind occur in the physical universe?. Oxford University Press, New York (2007)
Gonzalez, C., Lerch, F.J., Lebiere, C.: Instance-based learning in real-time dynamic decision making. Cogn. Sci. 27(4), 591–635 (2003)
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by The Air Force Office of Scientific Research grant number FA9550-14-1-0206 to Ion Juvina. The authors also would like to thank the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education who supported this research by appointing Michael Collins to the Student Research Participant Program at the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory’s 711th Human Performance Wing, Cognitive Models and Agents Branch.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Collins, M.G., Juvina, I., Gluck, K.A. (2016). Game-Specific and Player-Specific Knowledge Combine to Drive Transfer of Learning Between Games of Strategic Interaction. In: Xu, K., Reitter, D., Lee, D., Osgood, N. (eds) Social, Cultural, and Behavioral Modeling. SBP-BRiMS 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9708. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39931-7_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39931-7_18
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-39930-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-39931-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)