Abstract
We provide a symbolic model for multi-party computation based on linear secret-sharing scheme, and prove that this model is computationally sound: if there is an attack in the computational world, then there is an attack in the symbolic (abstract) model. Our original contribution is that we deal with the uniformity properties, which cannot be described using a single execution trace, while considering an unbounded number of sessions of the protocols in the presence of active and adaptive adversaries.
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Zhao, H., Sakurai, K. (2016). Computational Soundness of Uniformity Properties for Multi-party Computation Based on LSSS. In: Yung, M., Zhang, J., Yang, Z. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9565. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31550-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31550-8_7
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