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Compliance Games

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Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 8953))

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze compliance games, which are games induced by agent-labeled Kripke structures, goal formulas in the language of ctl and behavioral constraints. In compliance games, players are rewarded for achieving their goals while complying to social laws, and punished for non-compliance. Design of these games is an attempt at incentivizing agents to be compliant. We analyze the core and properties of compliance games, and study the connection between underlying logical framework and their properties.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Thus social laws are sometimes also called “behavioral constraints.”

  2. 2.

    While formally not necessary, throughout the paper we assume that an agent has to “own” at least one transition.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Pål Grønås Drange, Hannah Hansen, Truls Pedersen, and reviewers of EUMAS 2014 for helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing, Mathematics and Physics, Bergen University College, Bergen, Norway

    Piotr Kaźmierczak

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  1. Piotr Kaźmierczak
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Correspondence to Piotr Kaźmierczak .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

    Nils Bulling

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Kaźmierczak, P. (2015). Compliance Games. In: Bulling, N. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems. EUMAS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8953. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17130-2_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17130-2_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-17129-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-17130-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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