Abstract
Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks, which feature low-latency and full-coverage connectivity, promise to revolutionize the Internet and become an indispensable part of the next-generation communications network. However, due to the limited bandwidth and processing resources available on board, LEO satellite networks are susceptible to network attacks, especially link flooding attacks (LFAs). LFAs are a specific type of the notorious DoS attack where the attacker tries to cut off critical network links using seemingly legitimate traffic. Unlike attacks targeted directly on servers, LFAs undermine networks in a more insidious manner. In this paper, we present DoSat (DDoS on Satellites), an LFA attack model that focuses on the time-varying topology of satellite networks. The model takes advantage of such an opportunity to concentrate attack traffic: the traffic having been sent out during the process of path delay switching will reach the destination in tandem. We demonstrate through simulation experiments that DoSat can reduce the cost of LFAs by approximately 20% without any tradeoffs of attack’s undetectability.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and our shepherd for their helpful comments on our paper. Tianbo Lu is the corresponding author. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62162060) and the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No. 2023YFB3105902).
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Lu, T., Ding, X., Shang, J., Zhao, P., Zhang, H. (2024). DoSat: A DDoS Attack on the Vulnerable Time-Varying Topology of LEO Satellite Networks. In: Pöpper, C., Batina, L. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14584. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54773-7_11
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