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One-Hot Conversion: Towards Faster Table-Based A2B Conversion

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Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023 (EUROCRYPT 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14007))

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Abstract

Arithmetic to Boolean masking (A2B) conversion is a crucial technique in the masking of lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. It is also a crucial part of building a masked comparison which is one of the hardest to mask building blocks for active secure lattice-based encryption. We first present a new method, called one-hot conversion, to efficiently convert from higher-order arithmetic masking to Boolean masking using a variant of the higher-order table-based conversion of Coron et al. Secondly, we specialize our method to perform arithmetic to 1-bit Boolean functions. Our one-hot function can be applied to masking lattice-based encryption building blocks such as masked comparison or to determine the most significant bit of an arithmetically masked variable. In our benchmarks on a Cortex M4 processor, a speedup of 15 times is achieved over state-of-the-art table-based A2B conversions, bringing table-based A2B conversions within the performance range of the Boolean circuit-based A2B conversions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that the numbers given in [16] (Table 6) depict algorithmic operation counts and not cycles in an actual implementation. As there is no one-to-one match between the algorithmic operation count and the cycle count (e.g., memory accesses might be more expensive than local operations) one should be careful in comparing these numbers.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Michiel Van Beirendonck for the interesting discussions on this topic. This work was supported in part by CyberSecurity Research Flanders with reference number VR20192203, the Research Council KU Leuven (C16/15/058) and the Horizon 2020 ERC Advanced Grant (101020005 Belfort). Jan-Pieter D’Anvers is funded by FWO (Research Foundation - Flanders) as junior post-doctoral fellow (contract number 133185 / 1238822N LV).

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  1. imec-COSIC KU Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10 - bus 2452, 3001, Leuven, Belgium

    Jan-Pieter D’Anvers

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Correspondence to Jan-Pieter D’Anvers .

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  1. Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

    Carmit Hazay

  2. Simula UiB, Bergen, Norway

    Martijn Stam

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D’Anvers, JP. (2023). One-Hot Conversion: Towards Faster Table-Based A2B Conversion. In: Hazay, C., Stam, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023. EUROCRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14007. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30634-1_21

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