Abstract
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) provide high availability and low latency for end users through their geographically distributed and high-performance edge servers. Compared to the HTTP/1.1 protocol, the HTTP/2 protocol greatly improves network transmission performance, and most CDN vendors have begun to support HTTP/2. However, in a CDN-mediated network path between a client and an origin server, most CDN vendors deploy HTTP/2 in the client-to-CDN connection while still using HTTP/1.1 for the CDN-to-origin connection. This asymmetric usage of two versions of the HTTP protocol may lead to new types of attacks.
In this paper, we present two types of novel Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against CDNs: the HTTP/2 Traffic Amplification (HTA) attack and the HTTP/2 Slow Rate (HSR) attack. The HTA attack allows malicious users to exhaust the bandwidth of the origin server. The HSR attack can be used to consume all available connections of the origin server. We examined the HTA attack and the HSR attack on 10 popular CDNs to evaluate the feasibility and real-world impacts. Our experiment results show that all these CDNs are vulnerable to the HTA attack, and four of them are vulnerable to the HSR attack. In the worst-case scenario, attackers could amplify the network traffic by 403092 times, which poses a great DoS threat to CDN services. We responsibly disclosed these security vulnerabilities to the affected CDN vendors and received positive feedback from them. Some of them even rewarded us with bug bounties. At the end of this paper, we propose some mitigation countermeasures against these attacks.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. This work is supported by the Innovation Research Team for New Cyberspace Security Technology Project(Grant No. 2021RI01), and the Project of Industrial Internet Security Situation Awareness Platform of Yunnan Province.
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Song, H., Liu, J., Yang, J., Lei, X., Xue, G. (2022). Two Types of Novel DoS Attacks Against CDNs Based on HTTP/2 Flow Control Mechanism. In: Atluri, V., Di Pietro, R., Jensen, C.D., Meng, W. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2022. ESORICS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13554. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17140-6_23
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