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Exploring Phone-Based Authentication Vulnerabilities in Single Sign-On Systems

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Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13407))

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Abstract

Phone-based authenticators (PBAs) are commonly incorporated into multi-factor authentication and passwordless login schemes for corporate networks and systems. These systems require users to prove that they possess a phone or phone number associated with an account. The out-of-band nature of PBAs and their security may not be well understood by users. Further, the frequency of PBA prompts may desensitize users and lead to increased susceptibility to phishing or social engineering. We explore such risks to PBAs by exploring PBA implementation options and two types of attacks. When employed with a real-world PBA system, we found the symptoms of such attacks were subtle. A subsequent user study revealed that none of our participants noticed the attack symptoms, highlighting the limitations and risks associated with PBAs.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We refer to the device being authenticated as “the browser,” for simplicity. However, this approach can also be embedded within other application types.

  2. 2.

    Future engineering efforts may allow the script to run continuously and to automatically identify the login session. Since our goal was to measure participant reactions, for simplicity, we manually activated it in the user study.

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Acknowledgements

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1651540.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, 01609, USA

    Matthew M. Tolbert, Elie M. Hess, Mattheus C. Nascimento, Yunsen Lei & Craig A. Shue

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  1. Matthew M. Tolbert
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  2. Elie M. Hess
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  3. Mattheus C. Nascimento
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  4. Yunsen Lei
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  5. Craig A. Shue
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Craig A. Shue .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Malaga, Malaga, Spain

    Cristina Alcaraz

  2. University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

    Liqun Chen

  3. University of Kent, Canterbury, UK

    Shujun Li

  4. University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Pierangela Samarati

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Tolbert, M.M., Hess, E.M., Nascimento, M.C., Lei, Y., Shue, C.A. (2022). Exploring Phone-Based Authentication Vulnerabilities in Single Sign-On Systems. In: Alcaraz, C., Chen, L., Li, S., Samarati, P. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13407. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15777-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15777-6_11

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-15777-6

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