Abstract
In AsiaCrypt 2019, Genise, Gentry, Halevi, Li and Micciancio put forth two novel and intriguing computational hardness hypotheses: The inhomogeneous NTRU (\(\mathsf {iNTRU}\)) assumption and its matrix version \(\mathsf {MiNTRU}\). In this work, we break the integer case of the \(\mathsf {iNTRU}\) assumption through elementary lattice reduction, and we describe how the attack might be generalized to polynomial rings and to the low dimensional \(\mathsf {MiNTRU}\) assumption with small noise.
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Notes
- 1.
Hereinafter, we will only use the LLL algorithm for lattice reduction. Better results may be achieved using recent results on the BKZ algorithm (see [14]). However, the LLL algorithm suffices for our elementary analysis.
- 2.
For \(\mathcal {R}=\mathbb {Z}\) and random \(x_0,\dots ,x_{\ell }\), the probability that our first attack cannot be used is only \(\left( 1- \frac{\phi (q)}{q}\right) ^{\ell }\) where \(\phi \) denotes the Euler totient function. In particular, if q is prime our first attack should always work.
- 3.
The only possibility for which this would not be the case takes place when \(g=\gcd (y_0,\dots ,y_{\ell -1},q)>1\) as then \((0,\dots ,0,\frac{q}{g})\) will be the shortest lattice vector, but this scenario is rather improbable.
- 4.
This conclusion also holds in the case of a random tuple.
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Acknowledgement
Jim Barthel was supported in part by the Luxembourg National Research Fund through grant PRIDE15/10621687/SPsquared. Răzvan Roşie was supported in part by ERC grant CLOUDMAP 787390.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
A Proof of Lemma 1
We observe that by the properties of the Euclidean and the infinity norm, we have
where the maximum is taken over all the modulo reduced entries of \(r\mathbf {y}\). The right expression is equal to
Each event \(C_0,\dots ,C_{\ell -1}\) in the probability statement can be written as a union of events \(C_i=\bigcup _{\beta _i=-Bq}^{Bq} ([ry_iq\mod q^2]=\beta _i)\). As this event can only take place whenever \(\beta _i\) is a multiple of q (otherwise, the equality cannot be satisfied), we need only to consider the restricted union of events \(\bigcup _{\beta _i=-B}^{B} ([ry_iq\mod q^2]=\beta _i q)=\bigcup _{\beta _i=-B}^{B} ([ry_i\mod q]=\beta _i)\). Furthermore, \(C_{\ell }=\bigcup _{\beta _{\ell }=-Bq}^{Bq} ([r\mod q^2]=\beta _{\ell })=\bigcup _{\beta _{\ell }=-Bq}^{Bq} (r=\beta _{\ell })\) which is restricted to \(\beta _{\ell }\in S\) by the last condition. Thus, our overall probability is equal to
Reordering the events gives
As the events are mutually exclusive, this probability is equal to
Using Bayes’ conditional probability rule followed by Euler’s rule of interchanging finite sums, this quantity can be rewritten as:
Naturally \(\mathbb {P}\left( r=\beta _{\ell } \right) =\frac{1}{q^2}\) for any \(\beta _{\ell }\). It remains to investigate the value of the rightmost probability. To do so, we rewrite \(\beta _{\ell }=g_{\ell }\beta '_{\ell }\) where \(g_{\ell }=\gcd (\beta _{\ell },q)\). Then, for fixed \(\beta _0,\dots ,\beta _{\ell -1},\beta _{\ell }\):
The events in this probability will only be satisfiable if \(\beta _i\) is a multiple of \(g_{\ell }\), say \(\beta _i=\beta '_ig_{\ell }\). Thus, our cumulative probability rewrites as
where we used the fact that \(g_{\ell }=\gcd (\beta _{\ell },q)\) which implies that \(\beta '_{\ell }\) is invertible modulo \(\frac{q}{g_{\ell }}\). It is now clear that the remaining events are independent as they only depend on \(y_i\). Thus
Thereby, the cumulative probability is given by
\(\square \)
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Barthel, J., Müller, V., Roşie, R. (2021). On the (M)iNTRU Assumption in the Integer Case. In: Huang, Q., Yu, Y. (eds) Provable and Practical Security. ProvSec 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13059. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90402-9_11
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