Abstract
Controlled-channel attack is a novel side-channel attack that uses page faults (#PF) to infer process-sensitive information of guest-VMs. Existing protection schemes focus on restricting malicious OS of virtual machine access to page number information. They need to copy memory page content frequently or manually mark and recompile sensitive programs, which takes a lot of time and labor overhead. This paper introduces a hardware-based detection method against it in a different way. The Hypervisor monitors the modification of the guest page table entry (PTE) and the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) entries to find the trace of adversary’s operations. As there is a semantic gap between VMs and Hypervisor, we take advantage of VMI (Virtual Machine Introspection) to convert important data. To overcome the challenge of changeable page tables, we grasp the feature of the target attack and filter out required records. Experiments show that this method can effectively detect controlled-channel attacks. In general, the performance overhead of the operations related to context switching will increase but within an acceptable range.
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Acknowledgment
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. U1536204); Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory (No. 61421120301162112009).
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Qiang, C., Liu, W., Wang, L., Yu, R. (2018). Controlled Channel Attack Detection Based on Hardware Virtualization. In: Vaidya, J., Li, J. (eds) Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing. ICA3PP 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11334. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05051-1_28
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