Multiagent Resource Allocation: The Power and Limitations of Bilateral Deals (Extended Abstract) | SpringerLink
Skip to main content
Springer Nature Link
Log in

Multiagent Resource Allocation: The Power and Limitations of Bilateral Deals (Extended Abstract)

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies (EUMAS 2017, AT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 10767))

  • 733 Accesses

Abstract

This is a companion extended abstract to the invited talk given at EUMAS-2017. The talk was mostly based on [3, 4].

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
¥17,985 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
JPY 3498
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
JPY 5719
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
JPY 7149
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Black, D., Newing, R.A., McLean, I., McMillan, A., Monroe, B.L.: The theory of committees and elections. Springer, Netherlands (1958)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Chevaleyre, Y., et al.: Issues in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica 30, 3–31 (2006)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Maudet, N.: Simple negotiation schemes for agents with simple preferences: sufficiency, necessity and maximality. J. Auton. Agents Multiagent Syst. 20(2), 234–259 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Damamme, A., Beynier, A., Chevaleyre, Y., Maudet, N.: The power of swap deals in distributed resource allocation. In: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15), Istanbul, Turkey, pp. 625–633. ACM, May 2015

    Google Scholar 

  5. Dunne, P.E.: Extremal behaviour in multiagent contract negotiation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 23, 41–78 (2005)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Endriss, U., Maudet, N.: On the communication complexity of multilateral trading: extended report. J. Auton. Agents Multiagent Syst. 11(1), 91–107 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Endriss, U., Maudet, N., Sadri, F., Toni, F.: Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 25, 315–348 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  8. Moulin, H.: Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, New York (1988)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  9. Sandholm, T.W.: Contract types for satisficing task allocation: I theoretical results. In: Proceedings of the 1998 AAAI Spring Symposium on Satisficing Models (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Shapley, L., Scarf, H.: On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econ. 1(1), 23–37 (1974)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sorbonne Université, CNRS, Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris 6, LIP6, 75005, Paris, France

    Nicolas Maudet

Authors
  1. Nicolas Maudet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nicolas Maudet .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Évry Val d'Essonne, Paris Saclay, France

    Francesco Belardinelli

  2. Polytechnic University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

    Estefanía Argente

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Maudet, N. (2018). Multiagent Resource Allocation: The Power and Limitations of Bilateral Deals (Extended Abstract). In: Belardinelli, F., Argente, E. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies. EUMAS AT 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10767. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01712-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01713-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics