Abstract
Mandatory access control systems (MAC ) are often criticised for their lack of flexibility, but they protect a system’s confidentiality from a wide range of untrustworthy Trojan Horse programs. On the other hand, discretionary access control systems (DAC ) place no restriction on flexibility. But, at present, they are generally regarded as inherently defenceless against all kinds of untrustworthy programs. We believe that this trade-off is not unavoidable. We show that, for lack of distinction between a user’s and a program’s trustworthiness, the vulnerability of DAC is design-based. On these grounds we present a modified (DAC ). The central idea is the separation of the management of rights from other activities of a user. The resulting system offers the flexibility of (DAC ) and the protection of (MAC ).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bell, D.E., La Padula, L.J.: Secure computer system: Unified exposition and multics interpretation. MITRE Technical Report 2997. MITRE Corp, Bedford, MA (1975)
Castano, S., Fugini, M., Martella, G., Samarati, P.: Database Security. Addison-Wesley, Wokingham (1994)
Conway, R.W., Maxwell, W.L., Morgan, H.L.: On the Implementation of Security Measures in Information Systems. CACM 15(4), 211–220 (1972)
Feiertag, R.J., Levitt, K.N., Robinson, L.: Proving multilevel security of a system design. In: 6th ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles. ACM SIGOPS Operating System Review, vol. 11(5), pp. 57–65 (1977)
Graham, R.M.: Protection in an Information Processing Utility. CACM 11(5), 365–369 (1968)
Hoffman, L.J.: Computers and Privacy: A Survey. ACM CS 1(2), 85–103 (1969)
Landwehr, C.E.: Formal Models for Computer Security. ACMCS 13(3), 247–278 (1981)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Spalka, A., Cremers, A.B., Lehmler, H. (2000). Protecting Confidentiality against Trojan Horse Programs in Discretionary Access Control System. In: Dawson, E.P., Clark, A., Boyd, C. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10718964_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10718964_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67742-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45030-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive