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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 26
Volume 26, Number 1, January 2006
- Klaus Abbink:
Majority rip-off in referendum voting. 1-21 - Van Kolpin:
The modeling and analysis of rotten kids. 23-30 - Sebastiano Bavetta, Vitorocco Peragine:
Measuring autonomy freedom. 31-45 - Thomas Eichner, Rüdiger Pethig:
Efficient nonanthropocentric nature protection. 47-74 - Giora Slutzki, Oscar Volij:
Scoring of web pages and tournaments - axiomatizations. 75-92 - Gérard Hamiache:
A value for games with coalition structures. 93-105 - Donald G. Saari:
Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner? 107-129 - Drora Karotkin, Jacob Paroush:
Robustness of optimal decision rules where one of the team members is exceptionally qualified. 131-141 - Arkadii Slinko:
How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election. 143-153 - Guoqiang Tian:
The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production. 155-182 - J. Atsu Amegashie:
The 2002 Winter Olympics scandal: rent-seeking and committees. 183-189 - William V. Gehrlein:
The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences. 191-208 - Richard A. Chisik, Robert J. Lemke:
When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model. 209-215
Volume 26, Number 2, April 2006
- Bernard De Baets, Hans E. De Meyer, Bart De Schuymer:
Cyclic Evaluation of Transitivity of Reciprocal Relations. 217-238 - Youngsub Chun:
The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences. 239-253 - Bettina Klaus:
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences. 255-261 - Franz Dietrich:
General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures. 263-283 - Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan:
A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games. 285-304 - Shigehiro Serizawa:
Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation. 305-331 - Marek Kaminski:
A General Equilibrium Model of Multi-Party Competition. 333-361 - Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando Tohmé:
Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule. 363-383 - Ran Spiegler:
Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates. 385-402 - Françoise Forges:
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments. 403-419 - Dinko Dimitrov, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx, Shao Chin Sung:
Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games. 421-433
Volume 26, Number 3, June 2006
- Toyotaka Sakai, Masaki Shimoji:
Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice. 435-445 - Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan:
Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests. 447-453 - David P. Baron, Adam Meirowitz:
Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models. 455-470 - Satya R. Chakravarty, Ravi Kanbur, Diganta Mukherjee:
Population growth and poverty measurement. 471-483 - Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley:
Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules. 485-509 - Corrado Benassi, Alessandra Chirco:
Income Share Elasticity and Stochastic Dominance. 511-525 - Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Otto H. Swank:
Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control. 527-545 - Guillermo Owen, Bernard Grofman:
Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions. 547-569 - M. Josune Albizuri, Jesus Aurrekoetxea:
Coalition Configurations and the Banzhaf Index. 571-596 - Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan:
On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules. 597-601 - Luc Lauwers, Tom Van Puyenbroeck:
The Balinski-Young Comparison of Divisor Methods is Transitive. 603-606 - Ipek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver:
Nash implementation via hyperfunctions. 607-623 - Daniela Ambrosino, Vito Fragnelli, Maria E. Marina:
Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach. 625-643 - Elizabeth Maggie Penn:
Book Review: David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, Editors. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks. 645-649
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