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SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 13
Volume 13, Number 1, June 2014
- Ariel D. Procaccia:
Editor's introduction. 1 - Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
Notes from the EC'14 program chairs. 2-4 - Shuchi Chawla, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. 5-49 - Tayfun Sönmez:
Cadet-branch matching. 50-57 - Jonatha Anselmi, Danilo Ardagna, John C. S. Lui, Adam Wierman, Yunjian Xu, Zichao Yang:
The economics of the cloud: price competition and congestion. 58-63 - Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
Relaxing strategyproofness in one-sided matching. 64-67 - Ruggiero Cavallo:
Incentive compatible allocation without money. 68-71 - Denis Nekipelov:
Eliciting preferences of sponsored search advertisers: implications for mechanism design. 72-76 - Arthur Carvalho, Stanko Dimitrov, Kate Larson:
The output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection. 77-81
Volume 13, Number 2, December 2014
- Tim Roughgarden:
Approximately optimal mechanism design: motivation, examples, and lessons learned. 4-20 - Jacob D. Abernethy, Rafael M. Frongillo, Sindhu Kutty:
On risk measures, market making, and exponential families. 21-25 - Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Julián Mestre:
Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. 26-30 - Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. 31-35 - Umang Bhaskar, Katrina Ligett:
Network improvement for equilibrium routing. 36-40 - Jonathan R. Goldman, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Spliddit: unleashing fair division algorithms. 41-46 - Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri:
The cost of annoying ads. 47-52
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