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International Game Theory Review, Volume 11
Volume 11, Number 1, March 2009
- Silvia Miquel, Bas van Velzen, Herbert Hamers, Henk Norde:
Assignment Situations with Multiple Ownership and their Games. 1-13 - Claus-Jochen Haake:
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. 15-32 - Maria Sandsmark:
Spatial Oligopolies with Cooperative Distribution. 33-40 - Bryan C. McCannon:
Consumer Mistakes in Bertrand Games. 41-51 - Dunia López-Pintado:
Network Formation, Cost-Sharing and Anti-Coordination. 53-76 - Luca Lambertini, Gianpaolo Rossini:
The Gains from Cooperative R&d with a concave Technology and Spillovers. 77-85 - Juana Santamaria-Garcia:
Bargaining Power in the Nash Demand Game an Evolutionary Approach. 87-97 - Iris Auriol, Ezio Marchi:
Partitioning Games with Restricted Cooperation. 99-109 - Pär Torstensson:
An n-Person Rubinstein Bargaining Game. 111-115 - Konstantin Kogan, Charles S. Tapiero:
Book Review: "Supply Chain Games: Operations Management and Risk Valuation". 117-119
Volume 11, Number 2, June 2009
- Luisa Monroy, Amparo M. Mármol, Victoriana Rubiales:
A Bargaining Model for Finite n-Person Multi-Criteria Games. 121-139 - Toshiyuki Hirai:
The Core Coincides with the nucleolus Allocations in a Public Goods Economy with Taxation. 141-155 - Wilfried Pauwels, Peter M. Kort:
A Game of Settlements in Public Contracts. 157-179 - Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn:
Employment by Lotto Revisited. 181-198 - Thorsten Janus:
Trust and Culture. 199-206 - Yoshio Kamijo:
A Two-Step Shapley Value for Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures. 207-214 - Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn, Marco Slikker, Bas van Velzen:
A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of indivisible Objects. 215-227 - Jesús Getán, Jesús Montes, Carles Rafels:
A Note on the Monotonic Core. 229-235 - Rana Barua, Satya R. Chakravarty, Sonali Roy:
A Note on the Carreras-Coleman decisiveness Index. 237-245
Volume 11, Number 3, September 2009
- Joachim Rosenmüller:
A Value for Cephoidal NTU-Games. 247-272 - Bruno Viscolani:
Advertising Decisions in a Vertical Distribution Channel. 273-284 - Thomas Wiseman:
Sequential Choice and Non-Bayesian Observational Learning. 285-300 - David M. Ramsey:
A Large Population, Game Theoretic Model of Job-Search with discounting. 301-320 - Herbert Dawid, Michael Kopel, Thomas Dangl:
Trash IT or Sell IT? A Strategic Analysis of the Market Introduction of Product Innovations. 321-345 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Andreas Witzel:
A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation. 347-367 - L. Hernández-Lamoneda, Joss Sánchez-Pérez, F. Sánchez-Sánchez:
The Class of Efficient Linear Symmetric Values for Games in Partition Function Form. 369-382 - Juan Carlos Cesco:
A Necessary and sufficient Condition for the Non-Emptiness of the Socially Stable Core in Structured TU-Games. 383-389
Volume 11, Number 4, December 2009
- Marcin Dziubinski, Debabrata Datta, Jaideep Roy:
A Location Game on Disjoint Circles. 391-406 - Huibin Yan:
Uniqueness in Random-Proposer Multilateral Bargaining. 407-417 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan J. Vidal-Puga:
A Value for PERT Problems. 419-436 - Charles Audet, Slim Belhaiza, Pierre Hansen:
A New Sequence Form Approach for the Enumeration and Refinement of All Extreme Nash Equilibria for Extensive Form Games. 437-451 - André Casajus:
The Shapley Value, the Owen Value, and the veil of Ignorance. 453-457 - Rodica Branzei, Vito Fragnelli, Ana Meca, Stef Tijs:
On Cooperative Games Related to Market Situations and Auctions. 459-470 - Tom Norman:
Skew-Symmetry under Simultaneous Revisions. 471-478 - Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, Dimitris Voliotis:
A Necessary and sufficient Condition for convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games. 479-489
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