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Synthese, Volume 153
Volume 153, Number 1, November 2006
- Eli Dresner:
A Measurement Theoretic Account of Propositions. 1-22 - Alberto Voltolini:
Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts. 23-47 - Daniel Asher Krasner:
Smith on Indexicals. 49-67 - John Collins:
Proxytypes and Linguistic Nativism. 69-104 - Jeremy Avigad:
Mathematical Method and Proof. 105-159 - S. Luper:
Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account. 161-170
Volume 153, Number 2, November 2006
- Ruth Manor:
Solving the Heap. 171-186 - David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg:
Probability all the Way Up. 187-197 - Friederike Moltmann:
Unbound Anaphoric Pronouns: E-Type, Dynamic, and Structured-Propositions Approaches. 199-260 - Carl Gillett:
Samuel Alexander's Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists. 261-296 - Gerald Holton:
Philipp Frank at Harvard University: His Work and His Influence. 297-311 - Stephen Ellis:
Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action. 313-338 - Hans van Ditmarsch, Barteld P. Kooi:
The Secret of My Success. 339
Volume 153, Number 3, December 2006
- John Bickle:
Editor's introduction. 341-342 - Gualtiero Piccinini:
Computational explanation in neuroscience. 343-353 - Carl F. Craver:
When mechanistic models explain. 355-376 - Frances Egan, Robert J. Matthews:
Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way. 377-391 - Oron Shagrir:
Why we view the brain as a computer. 393-416 - Rick Grush:
How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. 417-450 - Jonathan Bentwich:
The duality principle: irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical computation to neuronal brain activation. 451-455 - G. G. Davelaar, Leon Abelmann:
Comment on Wang, Liu, and Wang (2003). 457-458
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