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Weakness ID: 470

Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.

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Description

The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.

Extended Description

If the product uses external inputs to determine which class to instantiate or which method to invoke, then an attacker could supply values to select unexpected classes or methods. If this occurs, then the attacker could create control flow paths that were not intended by the developer. These paths could bypass authentication or access control checks, or otherwise cause the product to behave in an unexpected manner. This situation becomes a doomsday scenario if the attacker can upload files into a location that appears on the product's classpath (CWE-427) or add new entries to the product's classpath (CWE-426). Under either of these conditions, the attacker can use reflection to introduce new, malicious behavior into the product.

Alternate Terms

Reflection Injection

Common Consequences

This table specifies different individual consequences associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.

Scope	Impact	Likelihood
Integrity Confidentiality Availability Other	Technical Impact: Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands; Alter Execution Logic The attacker might be able to execute code that is not directly accessible to the attacker. Alternately, the attacker could call unexpected code in the wrong place or the wrong time, possibly modifying critical system state.
Availability Other	Technical Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart; Other The attacker might be able to use reflection to call the wrong code, possibly with unexpected arguments that violate the API (CWE-227). This could cause the product to exit or hang.
Confidentiality	Technical Impact: Read Application Data By causing the wrong code to be invoked, the attacker might be able to trigger a runtime error that leaks sensitive information in the error message, such as CWE-536.

Potential Mitigations

Phase: Architecture and Design

Refactor your code to avoid using reflection.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Do not use user-controlled inputs to select and load classes or code.

Phase: Implementation

Apply strict input validation by using allowlists or indirect selection to ensure that the user is only selecting allowable classes or code.

Relationships

This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user may want to explore.

Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (CWE-1000)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	610	Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	913	Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources

Relevant to the view "Software Development" (CWE-699)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	399	Resource Management Errors

Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (CWE-1003)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	913	Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources

Relevant to the view "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms" (CWE-700)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
ChildOf	Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.	20	Improper Input Validation

Modes Of Introduction

The different Modes of Introduction provide information about how and when this weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which introduction may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the given phase.

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design
Implementation

Applicable Platforms

This listing shows possible areas for which the given weakness could appear. These may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms, Technologies, or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given weakness appears for that instance.

Languages

Java (Undetermined Prevalence)

PHP (Undetermined Prevalence)

Class: Interpreted (Sometimes Prevalent)

Demonstrative Examples

Example 1

A common reason that programmers use the reflection API is to implement their own command dispatcher. The following example shows a command dispatcher that does not use reflection:

(good code)

Example Language: Java

String ctl = request.getParameter("ctl");
Worker ao = null;
if (ctl.equals("Add")) {

ao = new AddCommand();

}
else if (ctl.equals("Modify")) {

ao = new ModifyCommand();

}
else {

throw new UnknownActionError();

}
ao.doAction(request);

A programmer might refactor this code to use reflection as follows:

(bad code)

Example Language: Java

String ctl = request.getParameter("ctl");
Class cmdClass = Class.forName(ctl + "Command");
Worker ao = (Worker) cmdClass.newInstance();
ao.doAction(request);

The refactoring initially appears to offer a number of advantages. There are fewer lines of code, the if/else blocks have been entirely eliminated, and it is now possible to add new command types without modifying the command dispatcher. However, the refactoring allows an attacker to instantiate any object that implements the Worker interface. If the command dispatcher is still responsible for access control, then whenever programmers create a new class that implements the Worker interface, they must remember to modify the dispatcher's access control code. If they do not modify the access control code, then some Worker classes will not have any access control.

One way to address this access control problem is to make the Worker object responsible for performing the access control check. An example of the re-refactored code follows:

(bad code)

Example Language: Java

String ctl = request.getParameter("ctl");
Class cmdClass = Class.forName(ctl + "Command");
Worker ao = (Worker) cmdClass.newInstance();
ao.checkAccessControl(request);
ao.doAction(request);

Although this is an improvement, it encourages a decentralized approach to access control, which makes it easier for programmers to make access control mistakes. This code also highlights another security problem with using reflection to build a command dispatcher. An attacker can invoke the default constructor for any kind of object. In fact, the attacker is not even constrained to objects that implement the Worker interface; the default constructor for any object in the system can be invoked. If the object does not implement the Worker interface, a ClassCastException will be thrown before the assignment to ao, but if the constructor performs operations that work in the attacker's favor, the damage will already have been done. Although this scenario is relatively benign in simple products, in larger products where complexity grows exponentially it is not unreasonable that an attacker could find a constructor to leverage as part of an attack.

Observed Examples

Reference	Description
CVE-2018-1000613	Cryptography API uses unsafe reflection when deserializing a private key
CVE-2004-2331	Database system allows attackers to bypass sandbox restrictions by using the Reflection API.

Detection Methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Effectiveness: High

Memberships

This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a weakness fits within the context of external information sources.

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	859	The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) Chapter 16 - Platform Security (SEC)
MemberOf	View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).	884	CWE Cross-section
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	991	SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Environment
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1347	OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A03:2021 - Injection
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1368	ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems
MemberOf	Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.	1415	Comprehensive Categorization: Resource Control

Vulnerability Mapping Notes

Usage: ALLOWED

(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)

Reason: Acceptable-Use

Rationale:

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Comments:

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Taxonomy Mappings

Mapped Taxonomy Name	Node ID	Fit	Mapped Node Name
7 Pernicious Kingdoms			Unsafe Reflection
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)	SEC06-J		Do not use reflection to increase accessibility of classes, methods, or fields

Related Attack Patterns

CAPEC-ID	Attack Pattern Name
CAPEC-138	Reflection Injection

References

[REF-6] Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess and Gary McGraw. "Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors". NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics. NIST. 2005-11-07. <https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf>.

Content History

Submissions
Submission Date	Submitter	Organization
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)	7 Pernicious Kingdoms
2006-07-19 (CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)
Modifications
Modification Date	Modifier	Organization
2008-07-01	Eric Dalci	Cigital
2008-07-01	updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
2008-08-01		KDM Analytics
2008-08-01	added/updated white box definitions
2008-09-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-09-08	updated Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
2008-10-14	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2008-10-14	updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Other_Notes
2009-01-12	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-01-12	updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
2009-05-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-05-27	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
2009-10-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2009-10-29	updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships
2011-03-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-03-29	updated Demonstrative_Examples
2011-06-01	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2011-06-01	updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2012-05-11	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2012-05-11	updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
2013-02-21	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2013-02-21	updated Relationships
2014-07-30	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2014-07-30	updated Relationships
2017-11-08	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2017-11-08	updated White_Box_Definitions
2019-01-03	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-01-03	updated Taxonomy_Mappings
2019-06-20	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2019-06-20	updated Relationships
2020-02-24	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-02-24	updated References, Relationships
2020-06-25	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2020-06-25	updated Potential_Mitigations
2021-10-28	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2021-10-28	updated Relationships
2023-01-31	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-01-31	updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
2023-04-27	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-04-27	updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
2023-06-29	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-06-29	updated Mapping_Notes
2023-10-26	CWE Content Team	MITRE
2023-10-26	updated Observed_Examples
Previous Entry Names
Change Date	Previous Entry Name
2008-04-11	Unsafe Reflection
2009-05-27	Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code (aka 'Unsafe Reflection')

Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')


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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')

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