The purpose of the text is threefold: 1] to contribute to the renaissance of Husserl interpretation around a) the continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts and b) his unpublished manuscripts; 2] to account for the historical origins and influence of the phenomenological project by articulating Husserl's relationship to authors before and after him; 3] to argue for the via...
The purpose of the text is threefold: 1] to contribute to the renaissance of Husserl interpretation around a) the continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts and b) his unpublished manuscripts; 2] to account for the historical origins and influence of the phenomenological project by articulating Husserl's relationship to authors before and after him; 3] to argue for the viability of the phenomenological project as conceived by Husserl in his later years. In regard to the last purpose, Luft's main argument shows that Husserlian phenomenology is not exhausted in the Cartesian (early) perspective, which is indeed its weakest and most vulnerable perspective. Husserlian phenomenology is a robust and philosophically necessary perspective when taken from its hermeneutic (late) perspective. And the ultimate point Luft makes in the text is that Husserl's hermeneutic phenomenology is distinct from other hermeneutic philosophers, namely, Cassirer, Heidegger and Gadamer. Unlike them, Husserl's focus centers on the work the subject must do in order to uncover the prejudices that guide his/her unreflective relationship to the world. In making his argument, Luft also demonstrates that there is a deep consistency within Husserl's own writings-from early to late-around the guiding themes of: 1] the natural attitude; 2] the need and function of the epoche; and 3] the split between egos, where the transcendental self (distinct from the natural self) is seen as the fundamental ability we all have to inquire into the genesis of our tradition-laden attitudes toward the world.
目录
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Table of Contents
Part 1. Husserl: the outlines of the transcendental-phenomenological system
1. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude
2. Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between lifeworld and Cartesianism
3. Some methodological problems arising in Husserl's late reflections on the phenomenological reduction
4. Facticity and historicity as constituents of the lifeworld in Husserl's late philosophy
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Table of Contents
Part 1. Husserl: the outlines of the transcendental-phenomenological system
1. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude
2. Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between lifeworld and Cartesianism
3. Some methodological problems arising in Husserl's late reflections on the phenomenological reduction
4. Facticity and historicity as constituents of the lifeworld in Husserl's late philosophy
5. Husserl's concept of the "transcendental person": another look at the Husserl-Heidegger relationship
6. Dialectics of the absolute: the systematics of the phenomenological system in Husserl's last period
Part 2. Husserl, Kant, and neo-Kantianism: from subjectivity to lifeworld as a world of culture
7. From being to givenness and back: some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl
8. Reconstruction and reduction: Natorp and Husserl on method and the question of subjectivity
9. A hermeneutic phenomenology of subjective and objective spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer
10. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms: between reason and relativism: a critical appraisal
Part 3. Toward a Husserlian hermeneutics
11. The subjectivity of effective history and the suppressed husserlian elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics
12. Husserl's "hermeneutical phenomenology" as a philosophy of culture
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Transcendental subjectivity is not in the world; it constitutes it. Only the splitting of the Ego makes it possible for the observer to have a “transcendental experience” while remaining a mundane Ego. The Ego is at the same time an object in the world and a subject for the world (Hua VI, 182–83). (查看原文)
That is to say, to Husserl’s defi nition of the Enlightenment belongs the steadfast belief that everything can in principle be understood, and that means nothing other than the enactment of the fundamental belief of the Enlightenment, namely, that the world stands under laws. And it is the task of science to discover, discern, and understand these laws. Science, then, is more than just natural science with a simple or singular model of reasoning (laws following strict causality, say); it is what is called Wissenschaft in Kant’s philosophy: a rational scrutiny in the manner just indicated with respect to the laws and their peculiar character in each possible region of experience. This is a meaning that “science” retains from the German idealists and up to Husserl’s notion of philosophy as r... (查看原文)
Introduction 没有对自然态度的反思的话，获得an overview of the correlational a prior是不可能的。 1.Husserl’s Phenomenological Discovery of the Natural Attitude 对于一种attitude而言，horizon永远是开放的。自然态度首先并不反思自身，且并没有客观性的意识，当有东...
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2 有用 Aubade 2021-01-15 00:10:09
算是没什么文本基础也能有不少收获的胡塞尔解读
0 有用 Bidasari 2020-08-21 14:05:07
神奇陆老师
2 有用 Aubade 2021-01-15 00:10:09
算是没什么文本基础也能有不少收获的胡塞尔解读
0 有用 Bidasari 2020-08-21 14:05:07
神奇陆老师