Anonymous credentials (AC) offer privacy in user-centric identity

management. They enable users to authenticate anonymously, revealing only necessary attributes. With the rise of decentralized

systems like self-sovereign identity, the demand for efficient AC

systems in a decentralized setting has grown. Relying on conventional AC systems, however, require users to present independent

credentials when obtaining them from different issuers, leading

to increased complexity. AC systems should ideally support being

multi-authority for efficient presentation of multiple credentials

from various issuers. Another vital property is issuer hiding, ensuring that the issuer’s identity remains concealed, revealing only

compliance with the verifier’s policy. This prevents unique identification based on the sole combination of credential issuers. To

date, there exists no AC scheme satisfying both properties simultaneously.

This paper introduces Issuer-Hiding Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials (IhMA), utilizing two novel signature primitives:

Aggregate Signatures with Randomizable Tags and Public Keys and

Aggregate Mercurial Signatures. We provide two constructions of

IhMA with different trade-offs based on these primitives and believe

that they will have applications beyond IhMA. Besides defining the

notations and rigorous security definitions for our primitives, we

provide provably secure and efficient constructions, and present

benchmarks to showcase practical efficiency.