Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Other sub-techniques of Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. [1] These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp
.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.[2][3] The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx
is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. [4] For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"
[5]
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit
and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell
subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows
run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute
value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
is set to autocheck autochk *
. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0045 | ADVSTORESHELL |
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the |
S0331 | Agent Tesla |
Agent Tesla can add itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.[9][10] |
G0026 | APT18 |
APT18 establishes persistence via the |
G0073 | APT19 |
An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key |
G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.[14] |
G0016 | APT29 | |
G0022 | APT3 |
APT3 places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[16] |
G0050 | APT32 |
APT32 established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.[17][18][19] |
G0064 | APT33 |
APT33 has deployed a tool known as DarkComet to the Startup folder of a victim, and used Registry run keys to gain persistence.[20][21] |
G0067 | APT37 |
APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key |
G0087 | APT39 |
APT39 has maintained persistence using the startup folder. [24] |
G0096 | APT41 |
APT41 created and modified startup files for persistence.[25] APT41 added a registry key in |
S0456 | Aria-body |
Aria-body has established persistence via the Startup folder or Run Registry key.[27] |
S0373 | Astaroth | |
S0414 | BabyShark |
BabyShark has added a Registry key to ensure all future macros are enabled for Microsoft Word and Excel as well as for additional persistence.[29][30] |
S0093 | Backdoor.Oldrea |
Backdoor.Oldrea adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.[31] |
S0031 | BACKSPACE |
BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[32] |
S0128 | BADNEWS |
BADNEWS installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.[33] |
S0337 | BadPatch |
BadPatch establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.[34] |
S0534 | Bazar |
Bazar can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.[35][36] |
S0127 | BBSRAT |
BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location |
S0268 | Bisonal |
Bisonal adds itself to the Registry key |
S0570 | BitPaymer |
BitPaymer has set the run key |
S0089 | BlackEnergy |
The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[39] |
S0204 | Briba |
Briba creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.[40] |
G0060 | BRONZE BUTLER |
BRONZE BUTLER has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.[41] |
S0471 | build_downer |
build_downer has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.[42] |
S0030 | Carbanak |
Carbanak stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.[43] |
S0484 | Carberp |
Carberp has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.[44] |
S0348 | Cardinal RAT |
Cardinal RAT establishes Persistence by setting the |
S0144 | ChChes |
ChChes establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.[46] |
G0080 | Cobalt Group |
Cobalt Group has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.[47] |
S0338 | Cobian RAT |
Cobian RAT creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.[48] |
S0244 | Comnie |
Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.[49] |
S0137 | CORESHELL |
CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.[50] |
S0046 | CozyCar |
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: |
S0235 | CrossRAT |
CrossRAT uses run keys for persistence on Windows |
G0070 | Dark Caracal |
Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to |
S0334 | DarkComet |
DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.[53][54] |
G0012 | Darkhotel |
Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[55] |
S0186 | DownPaper |
DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[56] |
G0074 | Dragonfly 2.0 |
Dragonfly 2.0 added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.[57] |
S0062 | DustySky |
DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in |
S0081 | Elise |
If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: |
S0082 | Emissary |
Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[61] |
S0367 | Emotet |
Emotet has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the |
S0363 | Empire |
Empire can modify the registry run keys |
S0396 | EvilBunny |
EvilBunny has created Registry keys for persistence in |
S0152 | EvilGrab |
EvilGrab adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.[46] |
S0568 | EVILNUM |
EVILNUM can achieve persistence through the Registry Run key.[67][68] |
S0512 | FatDuke |
FatDuke has used |
S0267 | FELIXROOT |
FELIXROOT adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.[70] |
G0051 | FIN10 |
FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[71][65] |
G0037 | FIN6 |
FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[72] |
G0046 | FIN7 |
FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[73][74] |
S0355 | Final1stspy |
Final1stspy creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[75] |
S0182 | FinFisher |
FinFisher establishes persistence by creating the Registry key |
S0036 | FLASHFLOOD |
FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[32] |
G0047 | Gamaredon Group |
Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.[78][79] |
S0168 | Gazer |
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[80][81] |
S0032 | gh0st RAT |
gh0st RAT has added a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[82][83] |
S0249 | Gold Dragon |
Gold Dragon establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[84] |
G0078 | Gorgon Group |
Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[85] |
S0531 | Grandoreiro |
Grandoreiro can use run keys and create link files in the startup folder for persistence.[86][87] |
S0417 | GRIFFON |
GRIFFON has used a persistence module that stores the implant inside the Registry, which executes at logon.[88] |
S0561 | GuLoader |
GuLoader can establish persistence via the Registry under |
S0499 | Hancitor |
Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[90] |
S0170 | Helminth |
Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.[91] |
S0087 | Hi-Zor |
Hi-Zor creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[92] |
G0126 | Higaisa |
Higaisa added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.[93][94] |
G0072 | Honeybee |
Honeybee uses a batch file that configures the ComSysApp service to autostart in order to establish persistence.[95] |
S0070 | HTTPBrowser |
HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the |
S0483 | IcedID |
IcedID has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.[98] |
G0100 | Inception |
Inception has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value |
S0259 | InnaputRAT |
Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key |
S0260 | InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.[101] |
S0015 | Ixeshe |
Ixeshe can achieve persistence by adding itself to the |
S0389 | JCry |
JCry has created payloads in the Startup directory to maintain persistence. [103] |
S0044 | JHUHUGIT |
JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.[104] |
S0088 | Kasidet |
Kasidet creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[105][106] |
S0265 | Kazuar | |
G0004 | Ke3chang |
Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[108] |
G0094 | Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[109][30][110] |
S0356 | KONNI |
A version of KONNI drops a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.[111] |
G0032 | Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[112][113][114] |
G0065 | Leviathan |
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[115][116] |
S0397 | LoJax |
LoJax has modified the Registry key |
S0582 | LookBack |
LookBack sets up a Registry Run key to establish a persistence mechanism.[118] |
S0532 | Lucifer |
Lucifer can persist by setting Registry key values |
S0409 | Machete | |
G0059 | Magic Hound |
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[122] |
S0167 | Matryoshka |
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[123][124] |
S0449 | Maze |
Maze has created a file named "startup_vrun.bat" in the Startup folder of a virtual machine to establish persistence.[125] |
S0500 | MCMD | |
S0455 | Metamorfo |
Metamorfo has written its executable path to a Registry Run key and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.[127][128][129] |
S0080 | Mivast |
Mivast creates the following Registry entry: |
S0553 | MoleNet |
MoleNet can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.[131] |
G0021 | Molerats |
Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.[132] |
S0256 | Mosquito |
Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key |
G0069 | MuddyWater |
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key |
G0129 | Mustang Panda |
Mustang Panda has created the registry key |
S0228 | NanHaiShu |
NanHaiShu modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.[140] |
S0336 | NanoCore |
NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[141] |
S0247 | NavRAT |
NavRAT creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.[142] |
S0034 | NETEAGLE |
The "SCOUT" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the |
S0198 | NETWIRE |
NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[143][144][89][145] |
S0385 | njRAT |
njRAT has added persistence via the Registry key |
S0353 | NOKKI |
NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key |
S0439 | Okrum |
Okrum establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[149] |
G0040 | Patchwork |
Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.[150][151] |
S0124 | Pisloader |
Pisloader establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.[152] |
S0254 | PLAINTEE |
PLAINTEE gains persistence by adding the Registry key |
S0013 | PlugX |
PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.[154][46][155] |
S0428 | PoetRAT |
PoetRAT has added a registry key in the |
S0012 | PoisonIvy |
PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[157] |
S0139 | PowerDuke |
PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.[158] |
S0441 | PowerShower |
PowerShower sets up persistence with a Registry run key.[159] |
S0145 | POWERSOURCE |
POWERSOURCE achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.[160] |
S0194 | PowerSploit |
PowerSploit's |
S0371 | POWERTON |
POWERTON can install a Registry Run key for persistence.[163] |
S0113 | Prikormka |
Prikormka adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.[164] |
G0056 | PROMETHIUM |
PROMETHIUM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.[165] |
S0147 | Pteranodon |
Pteranodon copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.[166] |
S0196 | PUNCHBUGGY |
PUNCHBUGGY has been observed using a Registry Run key.[167][168] |
S0192 | Pupy |
Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key |
G0024 | Putter Panda |
A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key |
S0458 | Ramsay |
Ramsay has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[171] |
S0172 | Reaver |
Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[172] |
S0153 | RedLeaves |
RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[46][173] |
S0332 | Remcos |
Remcos can add itself to the Registry key |
S0375 | Remexi |
Remexi utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.[175] |
S0379 | Revenge RAT |
Revenge RAT creates a Registry key at |
S0433 | Rifdoor |
Rifdoor has created a new registry entry at |
G0106 | Rocke |
Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.[178] |
S0270 | RogueRobin |
RogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.[179] |
S0090 | Rover |
Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in |
S0148 | RTM |
RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.[181] |
G0048 | RTM |
RTM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the RTM Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.[181][182] |
S0253 | RunningRAT |
RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key |
S0446 | Ryuk |
Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under |
S0085 | S-Type |
S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key |
S0074 | Sakula |
Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key |
S0461 | SDBbot |
SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [186][187] |
S0053 | SeaDuke |
SeaDuke is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[188] |
S0345 | Seasalt |
Seasalt creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under |
S0382 | ServHelper |
ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the |
G0104 | Sharpshooter |
Sharpshooter's first-stage downloader installed Rising Sun to the startup folder |
S0546 | SharpStage |
SharpStage has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.[131] |
S0444 | ShimRat |
ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key |
S0028 | SHIPSHAPE |
SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[32] |
G0121 | Sidewinder |
Sidewinder has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.[193][194][195] |
G0091 | Silence |
Silence has used |
S0226 | Smoke Loader |
Smoke Loader adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[197] |
S0159 | SNUGRIDE |
SNUGRIDE establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.[198] |
S0035 | SPACESHIP |
SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[32] |
S0058 | SslMM |
To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[199] |
S0491 | StrongPity |
StrongPity can use the |
S0018 | Sykipot |
Sykipot has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[200] |
S0586 | TAINTEDSCRIBE |
TAINTEDSCRIBE can copy itself into the current user’s Startup folder as "Narrator.exe" for persistence.[201] |
G0027 | Threat Group-3390 |
A Threat Group-3390 tool can add the binary’s path to the Registry key |
S0131 | TINYTYPHON |
TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[33] |
S0004 | TinyZBot |
TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[203] |
S0266 | TrickBot |
TrickBot establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[204] |
S0094 | Trojan.Karagany |
Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.[31][205] |
G0081 | Tropic Trooper |
Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[206][207] |
S0178 | Truvasys |
Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[208] |
G0010 | Turla |
A Turla Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key |
S0199 | TURNEDUP |
TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.[210] |
S0386 | Ursnif |
Ursnif has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.[211][212] |
S0136 | USBStealer |
USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[213] |
S0207 | Vasport |
Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.[214] |
S0442 | VBShower |
VBShower used |
G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[216] |
G0102 | Wizard Spider |
Wizard Spider has established persistence via the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and a shortcut within the startup folder.[217][218] |
S0341 | Xbash |
Xbash can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.[219] |
S0251 | Zebrocy |
Zebrocy creates an entry in a Registry Run key for the malware to execute on startup.[220][221][222] |
S0330 | Zeus Panda |
Zeus Panda adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.[223][224] |
G0128 | ZIRCONIUM |
ZIRCONIUM has created a Registry Run key named |
Mitigations
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
Detection
Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. [226] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
References
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Microsoft. (2018, May 31). 32-bit and 64-bit Application Data in the Registry. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
- Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
- Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
- Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017.
- Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Walter, J. (2020, August 10). Agent Tesla | Old RAT Uses New Tricks to Stay on Top. Retrieved December 11, 2020.
- Shelmire, A. (2015, July 06). Evasive Maneuvers by the Wekby group with custom ROP-packing and DNS covert channels. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
- Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
- Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
- Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.
- Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.
- Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
- Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.
- Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
- Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.
- FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.
- Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.
- Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
- Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
- Glyer, C, et al. (2020, March). This Is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
- CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
- Unit 42. (2019, February 22). New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved October 7, 2019.
- CISA, FBI, CNMF. (2020, October 27). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-301a. Retrieved November 4, 2020.
- Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
- Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
- Bar, T., Conant, S. (2017, October 20). BadPatch. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
- Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020.
- Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.
- Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
- Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
- F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
- Ladley, F. (2012, May 15). Backdoor.Briba. Retrieved February 21, 2018.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
- Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020.
- Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
- Giuliani, M., Allievi, A. (2011, February 28). Carberp - a modular information stealing trojan. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
- Grunzweig, J.. (2017, April 20). Cardinal RAT Active for Over Two Years. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
- PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
- Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.
- Yadav, A., et al. (2017, August 31). Cobian RAT – A backdoored RAT. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
- Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018.
- Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
- F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
- TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
- Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
- ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
- Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
- Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
- Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
- Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
- US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
- Özarslan, S. (2018, December 21). The Christmas Card you never wanted - A new wave of Emotet is back to wreak havoc. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
- Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
- Marschalek, M.. (2014, December 16). EvilBunny: Malware Instrumented By Lua. Retrieved June 28, 2019.
- Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.
- Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved January 28, 2021.
- Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
- FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved June 25, 2017.
- FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
- Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
- Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.
- Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2017.
- Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
- Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020.
- Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
- ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.
- Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.
- Quinn, J. (2019, March 25). The odd case of a Gh0stRAT variant. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
- Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
- Abramov, D. (2020, April 13). Grandoreiro Malware Now Targeting Banks in Spain. Retrieved November 12, 2020.
- ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020.
- Namestnikov, Y. and Aime, F. (2019, May 8). FIN7.5: the infamous cybercrime rig “FIN7” continues its activities. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
- Duncan, B. (2020, April 3). GuLoader: Malspam Campaign Installing NetWire RAT. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
- Anubhav, A., Jallepalli, D. (2016, September 23). Hancitor (AKA Chanitor) observed using multiple attack approaches. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
- Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2015, December 16). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1020: Dissecting the Malware Involved in the INOCNATION Campaign. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
- Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, June 4). New LNK attack tied to Higaisa APT discovered. Retrieved March 2, 2021.
- Singh, S. Singh, A. (2020, June 11). The Return on the Higaisa APT. Retrieved March 2, 2021.
- Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 02). McAfee Uncovers Operation Honeybee, a Malicious Document Campaign Targeting Humanitarian Aid Groups. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
- Desai, D.. (2015, August 14). Chinese cyber espionage APT group leveraging recently leaked Hacking Team exploits to target a Financial Services Firm. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
- Shelmire, A.. (2015, July 6). Evasive Maneuvers. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
- GReAT. (2014, December 10). Cloud Atlas: RedOctober APT is back in style. Retrieved May 8, 2020.
- ASERT Team. (2018, April 04). Innaput Actors Utilize Remote Access Trojan Since 2016, Presumably Targeting Victim Files. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
- Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.
- Sancho, D., et al. (2012, May 22). IXESHE An APT Campaign. Retrieved June 7, 2019.
- Lee, S.. (2019, May 14). JCry Ransomware. Retrieved June 18, 2019.
- ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 1: Approaching the Target. Retrieved November 8, 2016.
- Yadav, A., et al. (2016, January 29). Malicious Office files dropping Kasidet and Dridex. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
- Manuel, J. and Plantado, R.. (2015, August 9). Win32/Kasidet. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
- Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.
- Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
- Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.
- Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.
- Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
- Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
- Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
- FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
- ESET. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved July 2, 2019.
- Raggi, M. Schwarz, D.. (2019, August 1). LookBack Malware Targets the United States Utilities Sector with Phishing Attacks Impersonating Engineering Licensing Boards. Retrieved February 25, 2021.
- Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020.
- Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.
- Minerva Labs LTD and ClearSky Cyber Security. (2015, November 23). CopyKittens Attack Group. Retrieved September 11, 2017.
- Brandt, A., Mackenzie, P.. (2020, September 17). Maze Attackers Adopt Ragnar Locker Virtual Machine Technique. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
- Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
- Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Sierra, E., Iglesias, G.. (2018, April 24). Metamorfo Campaigns Targeting Brazilian Users. Retrieved July 30, 2020.
- Zhang, X.. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.
- Stama, D.. (2015, February 6). Backdoor.Mivast. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
- Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.
- GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.
- ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
- Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 10). MuddyWater expands operations. Retrieved November 2, 2018.
- Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, May 20). Recent MuddyWater-associated BlackWater campaign shows signs of new anti-detection techniques. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
- Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
- Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
- Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2020, November 23). TA416 Goes to Ground and Returns with a Golang PlugX Malware Loader. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
- F-Secure Labs. (2016, July). NANHAISHU RATing the South China Sea. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
- Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
- Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, May 31). NavRAT Uses US-North Korea Summit As Decoy For Attacks In South Korea. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
- McAfee. (2015, March 2). Netwire RAT Behind Recent Targeted Attacks. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
- Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
- Proofpoint. (2020, December 2). Geofenced NetWire Campaigns. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
- Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: "njRAT" Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
- Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
- Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
- Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
- Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
- Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015.
- Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020.
- Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.
- Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
- Lancaster, T. (2018, November 5). Inception Attackers Target Europe with Year-old Office Vulnerability. Retrieved May 8, 2020.
- Brumaghin, E. and Grady, C.. (2017, March 2). Covert Channels and Poor Decisions: The Tale of DNSMessenger. Retrieved March 8, 2017.
- PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
- PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
- Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
- Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
- Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
- Gorelik, M.. (2019, June 10). SECURITY ALERT: FIN8 IS BACK IN BUSINESS, TARGETING THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY. Retrieved June 13, 2019.
- Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.
- Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
- Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
- Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
- Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
- Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
- Livelli, K, et al. (2018, November 12). Operation Shaheen. Retrieved May 1, 2019.
- Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020.
- Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
- Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.
- Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
- Skulkin, O. (2019, August 5). Following the RTM Forensic examination of a computer infected with a banking trojan. Retrieved May 11, 2020.
- Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
- Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
- Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
- Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
- Grunzweig, J.. (2015, July 14). Unit 42 Technical Analysis: Seaduke. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). ‘Operation Oceansalt’ Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018.
- Vilkomir-Preisman, S. (2019, April 2). New ServHelper Variant Employs Excel 4.0 Macro to Drop Signed Payload. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
- Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020.
- Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Rewertz. (2020, April 20). Sidewinder APT Group Campaign Analysis. Retrieved January 29, 2021.
- Rewterz. (2020, June 22). Analysis on Sidewinder APT Group – COVID-19. Retrieved January 29, 2021.
- Cyble. (2020, September 26). SideWinder APT Targets with futuristic Tactics and Techniques. Retrieved January 29, 2021.
- Group-IB. (2018, September). Silence: Moving Into the Darkside. Retrieved May 5, 2020.
- Hasherezade. (2016, September 12). Smoke Loader – downloader with a smokescreen still alive. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
- FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
- Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
- Blasco, J. (2013, March 21). New Sykipot developments [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- USG. (2020, May 12). MAR-10288834-2.v1 – North Korean Trojan: TAINTEDSCRIBE. Retrieved March 5, 2021.
- Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.
- Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
- Boutin, J. (2020, October 12). ESET takes part in global operation to disrupt Trickbot. Retrieved March 15, 2021.
- Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.
- Moore, S. et al. (2020, April 30). Anomali Suspects that China-Backed APT Pirate Panda May Be Seeking Access to Vietnam Government Data Center. Retrieved May 19, 2020.
- Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2017, September 15). Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
- ESET Research. (2018, May 22). Turla Mosquito: A shift towards more generic tools. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
- Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
- Trend Micro. (2014, December 11). PE_URSNIF.A2. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
- Sioting, S. (2013, June 15). BKDR_URSNIF.SM. Retrieved June 5, 2019.
- Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
- Zhou, R. (2012, May 15). Backdoor.Vasport. Retrieved February 22, 2018.
- GReAT. (2019, August 12). Recent Cloud Atlas activity. Retrieved May 8, 2020.
- The Blackberry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021.
- DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
- Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
- Xiao, C. (2018, September 17). Xbash Combines Botnet, Ransomware, Coinmining in Worm that Targets Linux and Windows. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
- ESET. (2018, November 20). Sednit: What’s going on with Zebrocy?. Retrieved February 12, 2019.
- ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019.
- Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019.
- Brumaghin, E., et al. (2017, November 02). Poisoning the Well: Banking Trojan Targets Google Search Results. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Ebach, L. (2017, June 22). Analysis Results of Zeus.Variant.Panda. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
- Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
- Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.