Modify Registry, Technique T1112 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
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Modify Registry

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. [1] Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.

Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. [2] Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. [3] [4]

The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. [5] Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.

ID: T1112
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
ⓘ
Tactic: Defense Evasion
ⓘ
Platforms: Windows
ⓘ
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
Contributors: Bartosz Jerzman; David Lu, Tripwire; Travis Smith, Tripwire
Version: 1.4
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 14 August 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0028 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. [6].
S0677 AADInternals

AADInternals can modify registry keys as part of setting a new pass-through authentication agent.[7]
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.[8]
S0331 Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries.[9]

S1025 Amadey

Amadey has overwritten registry keys for persistence.[10]
G0073 APT19

APT19 uses a Port 22 malware variant to modify several Registry keys.[11]
G0050 APT32

APT32's backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor's configuration. [12]

G0082 APT38

APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.[13]
G0096 APT41

APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.[14][15]
S0438 Attor

Attor's dispatcher can modify the Run registry key.[16]
S0640 Avaddon

Avaddon modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.[17]
S0031 BACKSPACE

BACKSPACE is capable of deleting Registry keys, sub-keys, and values on a victim system.[18]
S0245 BADCALL

BADCALL modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\List.[19]
S0239 Bankshot

Bankshot writes data into the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Pniumj.[20]
S0268 Bisonal

Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity.[21]

S0570 BitPaymer

BitPaymer can set values in the Registry to help in execution.[22]

S1070 Black Basta

Black Basta can modify the Registry to enable itself to run in safe mode and to modify the icons and file extensions for encrypted files.[23][24][25][26][27][28]
S1068 BlackCat

BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Paramenters[29]
G0108 Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Registry modifications to specify a DLL payload.[30]

S0348 Cardinal RAT

Cardinal RAT sets HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load to point to its executable.[31]
S0261 Catchamas

Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service.[32]
S0572 Caterpillar WebShell

Caterpillar WebShell has a command to modify a Registry key.[33]
S0631 Chaes

Chaes can modify Registry values to stored information and establish persistence.[34]

S0674 CharmPower

CharmPower can remove persistence-related artifacts from the Registry.[35]
S0023 CHOPSTICK

CHOPSTICK may modify Registry keys to store RC4 encrypted configuration information.[36]
S0660 Clambling

Clambling can set and delete Registry keys.[37]
S0611 Clop

Clop can make modifications to Registry keys.[38]

S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to enable the execution of additional code.[39]
S0126 ComRAT

ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads.[40][41]

S0608 Conficker

Conficker adds keys to the Registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and various other Registry locations.[42][43]
S0488 CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can create a registry key using wdigest.[44]
S0115 Crimson

Crimson can set a Registry key to determine how long it has been installed and possibly to indicate the version number.[45]
S0527 CSPY Downloader

CSPY Downloader can write to the Registry under the %windir% variable to execute tasks.[46]
S0334 DarkComet

DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA="0" and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.[47][48]
S1066 DarkTortilla

DarkTortilla has modified registry keys for persistence.[49]
S0673 DarkWatchman

DarkWatchman can modify Registry values to store configuration strings, keylogger, and output of components.[50]
S1033 DCSrv

DCSrv has created Registry keys for persistence.[51]
G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.[52]
G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca modified the registry using the command reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d "[file path]" for persistence.[53]
G1003 Ember Bear

Ember Bear has used an open source batch script to modify Windows Defender registry keys.[54]
S0568 EVILNUM

EVILNUM can make modifications to the Regsitry for persistence.[55]
S0343 Exaramel for Windows

Exaramel for Windows adds the configuration to the Registry in XML format.[56]
S0569 Explosive

Explosive has a function to write itself to Registry values.[57]

S0267 FELIXROOT

FELIXROOT deletes the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open.[58]
S0679 Ferocious

Ferocious has the ability to add a Class ID in the current user Registry hive to enable persistence mechanisms.[59]
G0061 FIN8

FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.[60]
G0047 Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\AccessVBOM.[61][62]
S0666 Gelsemium

Gelsemium can modify the Registry to store its components.[63]
S0032 gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT has altered the InstallTime subkey.[64]
G0078 Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\.[65]
S0531 Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can modify the Registry to store its configuration at HKCU\Software\ under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.[66]
S0342 GreyEnergy

GreyEnergy modifies conditions in the Registry and adds keys.[67]
S0697 HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper has the ability to modify Registry keys to disable crash dumps, colors for compressed files, and pop-up information about folders and desktop items.[68][69][70]
S0376 HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT has modified Managed Object Format (MOF) files within the Registry to run specific commands and create persistence on the system.[71]

S0203 Hydraq

Hydraq creates a Registry subkey to register its created service, and can also uninstall itself later by deleting this value. Hydraq's backdoor also enables remote attackers to modify and delete subkeys.[72][73]
S0537 HyperStack

HyperStack can add the name of its communication pipe to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters\NullSessionPipes.[74]
S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole has a command to create, set, copy, or delete a specified Registry key or value.[75][76]
S0271 KEYMARBLE

KEYMARBLE has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.[77]
G0094 Kimsuky

Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.[78][79][80][81]
S0669 KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS has added and deleted keys from the Registry.[82]
S0356 KONNI

KONNI has modified registry keys of ComSysApp, Svchost, and xmlProv on the machine to gain persistence.[83][84]

S0397 LoJax

LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’.[85]
S0447 Lokibot

Lokibot has modified the Registry as part of its UAC bypass process.[86]

G1014 LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has used malware that adds Registry keys for persistence.[87][88]
S1060 Mafalda

Mafalda can manipulate the system registry on a compromised host.[89]
G0059 Magic Hound

Magic Hound has modified Registry settings for security tools.[90]
S0576 MegaCortex

MegaCortex has added entries to the Registry for ransom contact information.[91]
S1059 metaMain

metaMain can write the process ID of a target process into the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\DDE\tpid Registry value as part of its reflective loading activity.[89]
S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.[92][93][94][95]
S1047 Mori

Mori can write data to HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA and HKLM\Software\NFC\ and delete Registry values.[96][97]
S0256 Mosquito

Mosquito can modify Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft[dllname] to store configuration values. Mosquito also modifies Registry keys under HKCR\CLSID...\InprocServer32 with a path to the launcher.[98]
S0205 Naid

Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[99]
S0336 NanoCore

NanoCore has the capability to edit the Registry.[100][101]
S0691 Neoichor

Neoichor has the ability to configure browser settings by modifying Registry entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer.[102]
S0210 Nerex

Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.[103]
S0457 Netwalker

Netwalker can add the following registry entry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE{8 random characters}.[104]
S0198 NETWIRE

NETWIRE can modify the Registry to store its configuration information.[105]
C0002 Night Dragon

During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and manipulate the Registry.[106]
S1090 NightClub

NightClub can modify the Registry to set the ServiceDLL for a service created by the malware for persistence.[107]
S0385 njRAT

njRAT can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.[108][109]
C0006 Operation Honeybee

During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that modified registry keys.[110]
C0014 Operation Wocao

During Operation Wocao, the threat actors enabled Wdigest by changing the HKLM\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest registry value from 0 (disabled) to 1 (enabled).[111]
S0229 Orz

Orz can perform Registry operations.[112]
S0664 Pandora

Pandora can write an encrypted token to the Registry to enable processing of remote commands.[113]
G0040 Patchwork

A Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.[114]
S1050 PcShare

PcShare can delete its persistence mechanisms from the registry.[115]
S0158 PHOREAL

PHOREAL is capable of manipulating the Registry.[116]
S0517 Pillowmint

Pillowmint has modified the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM to store a malicious payload.[117]
S0501 PipeMon

PipeMon has modified the Registry to store its encrypted payload.[118]
S0254 PLAINTEE

PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.[119]
S0013 PlugX

PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.[120]
S0428 PoetRAT

PoetRAT has made registry modifications to alter its behavior upon execution.[121]
S0012 PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new system device.[122]
S0518 PolyglotDuke

PolyglotDuke can write encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.[123]
S0441 PowerShower

PowerShower has added a registry key so future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default, and has removed all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process.[124]
S1058 Prestige

Prestige has the ability to register new registry keys for a new extension handler via HKCR\.enc and HKCR\enc\shell\open\command.[125]
S0583 Pysa

Pysa has modified the registry key "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System" and added the ransom note.[126]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.[127][128]
S0269 QUADAGENT

QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.[129]
S0262 QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT has a command to edit the Registry on the victim’s machine.[130][131]
S0662 RCSession

RCSession can write its configuration file to the Registry.[37][132]
S0075 Reg

Reg may be used to interact with and modify the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.[1]
S0511 RegDuke

RegDuke can create seemingly legitimate Registry key to store its encryption key.[123]
S0019 Regin

Regin appears to have functionality to modify remote Registry information.[133]
S0332 Remcos

Remcos has full control of the Registry, including the ability to modify it.[134]
S0496 REvil

REvil can modify the Registry to save encryption parameters and system information.[135][136][137][138][139]
S0240 ROKRAT

ROKRAT can modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\ registry key so it can bypass the VB object model (VBOM) on a compromised host.[140]
S0090 Rover

Rover has functionality to remove Registry Run key persistence as a cleanup procedure.[141]
S0148 RTM

RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.[142]
S0596 ShadowPad

ShadowPad can modify the Registry to store and maintain a configuration block and virtual file system.[143][53]
S0140 Shamoon

Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.[144][145][146]
S0444 ShimRat

ShimRat has registered two registry keys for shim databases.[147]
S0589 Sibot

Sibot has modified the Registry to install a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot.[148]
G0091 Silence

Silence can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.[149]
S0692 SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can modify registry keys, including to enable or disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).[150]
S0533 SLOTHFULMEDIA

SLOTHFULMEDIA can add, modify, and/or delete registry keys. It has changed the proxy configuration of a victim system by modifying the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry.[151]
S0649 SMOKEDHAM

SMOKEDHAM has modified registry keys for persistence, to enable credential caching for credential access, and to facilitate lateral movement via RDP.[152]
S0157 SOUNDBITE

SOUNDBITE is capable of modifying the Registry.[116]
S0142 StreamEx

StreamEx has the ability to modify the Registry.[153]
S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet can create registry keys to load driver files.[154]
S0559 SUNBURST

SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\[service_name]\Start registry entries to value 4.[155][156] It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.[157]
S0242 SynAck

SynAck can manipulate Registry keys.[158]
S0663 SysUpdate

SysUpdate can write its configuration file to Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.[113]
G0092 TA505

TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry.[159]
S0011 Taidoor

Taidoor has the ability to modify the Registry on compromised hosts using RegDeleteValueA and RegCreateKeyExA.[160]
S0467 TajMahal

TajMahal can set the KeepPrintedJobs attribute for configured printers in SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers to enable document stealing.[161]
S1011 Tarrask

Tarrask is able to delete the Security Descriptor (SD) registry subkey in order to "hide" scheduled tasks.[162]
S0560 TEARDROP

TEARDROP modified the Registry to create a Windows service for itself on a compromised host.[163]
G0027 Threat Group-3390

A Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services.[164][113]
S0665 ThreatNeedle

ThreatNeedle can modify the Registry to save its configuration data as the following RC4-encrypted Registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\GameCon.[165]
S0668 TinyTurla

TinyTurla can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.[166]
S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot can modify registry entries.[167]
G0010 Turla

Turla has modify Registry values to store payloads.[168][169]
S0263 TYPEFRAME

TYPEFRAME can install encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.[170]
S0022 Uroburos

Uroburos can store configuration information in the Registry including the initialization vector and AES key needed to find and decrypt other Uroburos components.[171]
S0386 Ursnif

Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.[172][173]
S0476 Valak

Valak has the ability to modify the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64 to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads.[174][175][176]
S0180 Volgmer

Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.[177][178]
S0670 WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can create HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command as a new registry key during privilege escalation.[179][180]

S0612 WastedLocker

WastedLocker can modify registry values within the Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry key.[181]
S0579 Waterbear

Waterbear has deleted certain values from the Registry to load a malicious DLL.[182]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has modified the Registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest by setting the UseLogonCredential registry value to 1 in order to force credentials to be stored in clear text in memory. Wizard Spider has also modified the WDigest registry key to allow plaintext credentials to be cached in memory.[183][184]
S0330 Zeus Panda

Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters.[185]
S0350 zwShell

zwShell can modify the Registry.[106]
S0412 ZxShell

ZxShell can create Registry entries to enable services to run.[186]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions

Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0017 Command Command Execution

Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to change, conceal, and/or delete information in the Registry. The Registry may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Flow

Remote access to the registry can be achieved via

  • Windows API function RegConnectRegistry
  • command line via reg.exe
  • graphically via regedit.exe

All of these behaviors call into the Windows API, which uses the NamedPipe WINREG over SMB to handle the protocol information. This network can be decoded with wireshark or a similar sensor, and can also be detected by hooking the API function.

Analytic 1 - Remote Registry

flows = search Flow:Messagewinreg = filter flows where (dest_port == 445 and proto_info.pipe == "WINREG")winreg_modify = filter flows where (proto_info.function == "Create" or proto_info.function == "SetValue")
DS0009 Process OS API Execution

Monitor for API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. [2] Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns [4] and RegDelNull [187]. Other API calls relevant to Registry Modification include RegOpenKeyExA, RegCreateKeyExA, RegDeleteKeyExA, RegDeleteValueExA, RegEnumKeyExA, RegEnumValueExA, among others.

Note: Most EDR tools do not support direct monitoring of API calls due to the sheer volume of calls produced by an endpoint but may have alerts or events that are based on abstractions of OS API calls. Dynamic malware analysis tools (i.e., sandboxes) can be used to trace the execution, including OS API calls, for a single PE binary.

Process Creation

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change, conceal, and/or delete information in the Registry. (i.e. reg.exe, regedit.exe). The analytic is oriented around detecting invocations of Reg where the parent executable is an instance of cmd.exe that wasn’t spawned by explorer.exe. The built-in utility reg.exe provides a command-line interface to the registry, so that queries and modifications can be performed from a shell, such as cmd.exe. When a user is responsible for these actions, the parent of cmd.exewill typically be explorer.exe. Occasionally, power users and administrators write scripts that do this behavior as well, but likely from a different process tree. These background scripts must be baselined so they can be tuned out accordingly. Analytic Event IDs are for Sysmon (Event ID 1 - process create) and Windows Security Log (Event ID 4688 - a new process has been created).

Analytic 1 - Suspicious Processes

reg_processes = filter processes where ( (event_id == "1" OR event_id == "4688") AND (exe == "reg.exe" AND parent_exe == "cmd.exe"))cmd_processes = filter processes where ( (event_id == "1" OR event_id == "4688") AND (exe == "cmd.exe" AND parent_exe != "explorer.exe""))reg_and_cmd_processes = join (reg_processes, cmd_processes) where (reg.parent_pid == cmd.pid and reg.hostname == cmd.hostname)

Analytic 2 - Rare LolBAS Command Lines

lolbas_processes = filter processes where (exe = "At.exe" OR exe = "Atbroker.exe" OR exe = "Bash.exe" OR exe = "Bitsadmin.exe" OR exe = "Certutil.exe" OR exe = "Cmd.exe" OR exe = "Cmdkey.exe" OR exe = "Cmstp.exe" OR exe = "Control.exe" OR exe = "Csc.exe" OR exe = "Cscript.exe" OR exe = "Dfsvc.exe" OR exe = "Diskshadow.exe" OR exe = "Dnscmd.exe" OR exe = "Esentutl.exe" OR exe = "Eventvwr.exe" OR exe = "Expand.exe" OR exe = "Extexport.exe" OR exe = "Extrac32.exe" OR exe = "Findstr.exe" OR exe = "Forfiles.exe" OR exe = "Ftp.exe" OR exe = "Gpscript.exe" OR exe = "Hh.exe" OR exe = "Ie4uinit.exe" OR exe = "Ieexec.exe" OR exe = "Infdefaultinstall.exe" OR exe = "Installutil.exe" OR exe = "Jsc.exe" OR exe = "Makecab.exe" OR exe = "Mavinject.exe" OR exe = "Microsoft.Workflow.r.exe" OR exe = "Mmc.exe" OR exe = "Msbuild.exe" OR exe = "Msconfig.exe" OR exe = "Msdt.exe" OR exe = "Mshta.exe" OR exe = "Msiexec.exe" OR exe = "Odbcconf.exe" OR exe = "Pcalua.exe" OR exe = "Pcwrun.exe" OR exe = "Presentationhost.exe" ORexe = "Print.exe" OR exe = "Reg.exe" OR exe = "Regasm.exe" OR exe = "Regedit.exe" OR exe = "Register-cimprovider.exe" OR exe = "Regsvcs.exe" OR exe = "Regsvr32.exe" OR exe = "Replace.exe" OR exe = "Rpcping.exe" OR exe = "Rundll32.exe" OR exe = "Runonce.exe" OR exe = "Runscripthelper.exe" OR exe = "Sc.exe" OR exe = "Schtasks.exe" OR exe = "Scriptrunner.exe" OR exe = "SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe" OR exe = "Tttracer.exe" OR exe = "Verclsid.exe" OR exe = "Wab.exe" OR exe = "Wmic.exe" OR exe = "Wscript.exe" OR exe = "Wsreset.exe" OR exe = "Xwizard.exe" OR exe = "Advpack.dll OR exe = "Comsvcs.dll OR exe = "Ieadvpack.dll OR exe = "Ieaframe.dll OR exe = "Mshtml.dll OR exe = "Pcwutl.dll OR exe = "Setupapi.dll OR exe = "Shdocvw.dll OR exe = "Shell32.dll OR exe = "Syssetup.dll ORexe = "Url.dll OR exe = "Zipfldr.dll OR exe = "Appvlp.exe" OR exe = "Bginfo.exe" OR exe = "Cdb.exe" OR exe = "csi.exe" OR exe = "Devtoolslauncher.exe" OR exe = "dnx.exe" OR exe = "Dxcap.exe" OR exe = "Excel.exe" OR exe = "Mftrace.exe" OR exe = "Msdeploy.exe" OR exe = "msxsl.exe" OR exe = "Powerpnt.exe" OR exe = "rcsi.exe" OR exe = "Sqler.exe" OR exe = "Sqlps.exe" OR exe = "SQLToolsPS.exe" OR exe = "Squirrel.exe" OR exe = "te.exe" OR exe = "Tracker.exe" OR exe = "Update.exe" OR exe = "vsjitdebugger.exe" OR exe = "Winword.exe" OR exe = "Wsl.exe" OR exe = "CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 OR exe = "CL_Invocation.ps1 OR exe = "Manage-bde.wsf OR exe = "Pubprn.vbs OR exe = "Slmgr.vbs OR exe = "Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs OR exe = "winrm.vbs OR exe = "Pester.bat)process_count = count(lolbas_processes) by processprocess_count_avg = average(process_count)process_count_stdev = standard_deviation(process_count)lower_bound = process_count_avg - stdev * 1.5outliers = filter lolbas_processes where (process_count < lower_bound)

DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Creation

Monitor for newly constructed registry keys or values to aid in persistence and execution. Detection of creation of registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode. The key SafeDllSearchMode, if set to 0, will block the Windows mechanism for the search DLL order and adversaries may execute their own malicious dll.

Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Creation of SafeDllSearchMode Key Set to 0

safe_dll_search_processes = filter processes where command_line CONTAINS("SafeDllSearchMode") AND ((command_line CONTAINS("reg") AND command_line CONTAINS("add") AND command_line CONTAINS("/d")) OR (command_line CONTAINS("Set-ItemProperty") AND command_line CONTAINS(-value)) OR ((command_line CONTAINS("00000000") AND command_line CONTAINS(0)))reg_keys = search Registry:value_editsafe_dll_reg_keys = filter reg_keys where value="SafeDllSearchMode" AND value_data="0"
Windows Registry Key Deletion

Monitor for unexpected deletion of windows registry keys to hide configuration information, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Windows Registry Key Modification

Monitor for changes made to windows registry keys or values. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). [188] Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.

Detection of modification of the registry key values of Notify, Userinit, and Shell located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKEY_LOCAL_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon. When a user logs on, the Registry key values of Notify, Userinit and Shell are used to load dedicated Windows component. Attackers may insert malicious payload following the legitimate value to launch a malicious payload.

Detection of the modification of the registry key Common Startup located in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\ and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders. When a user logs on, any files located in the Startup Folder are launched. Attackers may modify these folders with other files in order to evade detection set on these default folders. This detection focuses on EventIDs 4688 and 1 for process creation and EventID 4657 for the modification of the Registry Keys.

Analytic 1 - Registry Edit with Modification of Userinit, Shell or Notify

logon_reg_processes = filter processes where command_line CONTAINS("\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon") AND (command_line CONTAINS("Userinit") OR command_line CONTAINS("Shell") OR command_line CONTAINS("Notify")) AND (((command_line CONTAINS("reg") OR command_line CONTAINS("add") OR command_line CONTAINS("/d")) OR (command_line CONTAINS("Set-ItemProperty") OR command_line CONTAINS("New-ItemProperty") OR command_line CONTAINS("-value"))))reg_keys = search Registry:value_editlogon_reg_keys = filter reg_keys where (value="Userinit" OR value="Shell" OR value="Notify")

Analytic 2 - Modification of Default Startup Folder in the Registry Key ‘Common Startup’

logon_reg_processes = filter processes where (command_line CONTAINS("reg") AND command_line CONTAINS("add") AND command_line CONTAINS("/d") OR (command_line CONTAINS("Set-ItemProperty") AND command_line CONTAINS("-value")) AND command_line CONTAINS("Common Startup"))reg_keys = search Registry:value_editlogon_reg_keys = filter reg_keys where value="Common Startup"

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