{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,7]],"date-time":"2024-06-07T09:11:59Z","timestamp":1717751519734},"reference-count":12,"publisher":"MDPI AG","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,2,9]],"date-time":"2017-02-09T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1486598400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Games"],"abstract":"Might the resource costliness of making signals credible be low or negligible? Using a job market as an example, we build a signaling model to determine the extent to which a transfer from an applicant might replace a resource cost as an equilibrium method of achieving signal credibility. Should a \ufb01rm\u2019s announcement of hiring for an open position be believed, the \ufb01rm has an incentive to use a properly-calibrated fee to implement a separating equilibrium. The result is robust to institutional changes, outside options, many \ufb01rms or many applicants and applicant risk aversion, though a suf\ufb01ciently risk-averse applicant who is suf\ufb01ciently likely to be a high type may lead to a preference for a pooling equilibrium.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.3390\/g8010011","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,2,10]],"date-time":"2017-02-10T10:27:09Z","timestamp":1486722429000},"page":"11","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["The Welfare Cost of Signaling"],"prefix":"10.3390","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Fan","family":"Yang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics area, New York University Shanghai, 1555 Century Ave, Pudong, Shanghai 200122, China"},{"name":"Economics Department, University of Missouri, 901 University Avenue, Columbia, MO 65211-1140, USA"}]},{"given":"Ronald","family":"Harstad","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Economics Department, University of Missouri, 901 University Avenue, Columbia, MO 65211-1140, USA"}]}],"member":"1968","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,2,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"355","DOI":"10.2307\/1882010","article-title":"Job market signaling","volume":"87","author":"Spence","year":"1973","journal-title":"Q. 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(1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press."},{"key":"ref_11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"25","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01766400","article-title":"Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games","volume":"4","author":"Selten","year":"1975","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"ref_12","first-page":"1019","article-title":"A Signaling Explanation for Charity","volume":"86","author":"Glazer","year":"1996","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."}],"container-title":["Games"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/8\/1\/11\/pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,7]],"date-time":"2024-06-07T00:10:55Z","timestamp":1717719055000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.mdpi.com\/2073-4336\/8\/1\/11"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2017,2,9]]},"references-count":12,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,3]]}},"alternative-id":["g8010011"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/g8010011","relation":{},"ISSN":["2073-4336"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2073-4336","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2017,2,9]]}}}