乐胖代购免代理版

{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,11,27]],"date-time":"2023-11-27T18:38:13Z","timestamp":1701110293896},"reference-count":56,"publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","issue":"4","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Operations Research"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,7]]},"abstract":" In \u201cRobust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition,\u201d T. Roughgarden, I. Talgam-Cohen, and Q. Yan revisit the classic Bulow\u2013Klemperer result. This result compares the revenues of two well-known auction formats: the welfare-maximizing Vickrey auction and the revenue-maximizing Myerson auction. It shows that, with an extra bidder competing for the item, the Vickrey auction becomes as good as the Myerson auction in terms of revenue while maintaining independence from prior distributional information about bidders\u2019 valuations. Unfortunately, Myerson\u2019s toolbox for revenue-optimal auction design does not extend to combinatorial auctions with multiple heterogenous items, for which optimizing revenue remains a challenge\u2014especially if we want auction designs that are simple and robust enough to use in practice. This paper extends the Bulow\u2013Klemperer result to multiple heterogenous items by showing that a prior-independent, simple, welfare-maximizing auction with additional competing bidders achieves as much revenue as the ill-understood optimal auction. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2019.1929","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,26]],"date-time":"2020-06-26T19:47:45Z","timestamp":1593200865000},"page":"1074-1094","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"68","author":[{"given":"Tim","family":"Roughgarden","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027;"}]},{"ORCID":"http:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2838-3264","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Inbal","family":"Talgam-Cohen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Computer Science Department, Technion, 3200003 Haifa, Israel;"}]},{"given":"Qiqi","family":"Yan","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Google AI, Mountain View, California 94043"}]}],"member":"109","reference":[{"key":"B1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1002\/9780470277331"},{"key":"B2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ausubel LM, Milgrom PR (2006) The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction. 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