{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,15]],"date-time":"2024-09-15T00:52:36Z","timestamp":1726361556762},"reference-count":27,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]],"date-time":"2018-04-27T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1524787200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]},"abstract":"BGP prefix hijacking is a threat to Internet operators and users. Several mechanisms or modifications to BGP that protect the Internet against it have been proposed. However, the reality is that most operators have not deployed them and are reluctant to do so in the near future. Instead, they rely on basic - and often inefficient - proactive defenses to reduce the impact of hijacking events, or on detection based on third party services and reactive approaches that might take up to several hours. In this work, we present the results of a survey we conducted among 75 network operators to study: (a) the operators' awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks, (b) presently used defenses (if any) against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses. We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as well as contribute towards designing new defense mechanisms that satisfy the requirements of the operators.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3211852.3211862","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,30]],"date-time":"2018-04-30T11:58:18Z","timestamp":1525089498000},"page":"64-69","update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":42,"title":["A Survey among Network Operators on BGP Prefix Hijacking"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"48","author":[{"given":"Pavlos","family":"Sermpezis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"FORTH-ICS"}]},{"given":"Vasileios","family":"Kotronis","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"FORTH-ICS"}]},{"given":"Alberto","family":"Dainotti","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"CAIDA, UC San Diego"}]},{"given":"Xenofontas","family":"Dimitropoulos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"FORTH-ICS, University of Crete"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_2_1_2","unstructured":"https:\/\/www.ripe.net\/publications\/news\/industry-developments\/youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study. https:\/\/www.ripe.net\/publications\/news\/industry-developments\/youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_2_2","unstructured":"http:\/\/www.bgpmon.net\/chinese-isp-hijacked-10-of-the-internet\/. http:\/\/www.bgpmon.net\/chinese-isp-hijacked-10-of-the-internet\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_3_2","unstructured":"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2014\/08\/isp-bitcoin-theft\/. https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2014\/08\/isp-bitcoin-theft\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_4_2","unstructured":"http:\/\/seclists.org\/nanog\/2016\/Sep\/122. http:\/\/seclists.org\/nanog\/2016\/Sep\/122."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_5_2","unstructured":"http:\/\/dyn.com\/blog\/iran-leaks-censorship-via-bgp-hijacks\/. http:\/\/dyn.com\/blog\/iran-leaks-censorship-via-bgp-hijacks\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_6_2","unstructured":"https:\/\/arstechnica.com\/security\/2017\/04\/russian-controlled-telecom-hijacks-financial-services-internet-traffic\/. https:\/\/arstechnica.com\/security\/2017\/04\/russian-controlled-telecom-hijacks-financial-services-internet-traffic\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_7_2","unstructured":"https:\/\/bgpmon.net\/bgp-leak-causing-internet-outages-in-japan-and-beyond\/. https:\/\/bgpmon.net\/bgp-leak-causing-internet-outages-in-japan-and-beyond\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_8_2","unstructured":"https:\/\/bgpmon.net\/popular-destinations-rerouted-to-russia\/. https:\/\/bgpmon.net\/popular-destinations-rerouted-to-russia\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_9_2","unstructured":"BGPmon (commercial). http:\/\/www.bgpmon.net. BGPmon (commercial). http:\/\/www.bgpmon.net."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_10_2","unstructured":"Survey on BGP prefix hijacking. http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/hijack-survey. Survey on BGP prefix hijacking. http:\/\/tinyurl.com\/hijack-survey."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_11_2","unstructured":"YouTube Hijacking: A RIPE NCC RIS case study. http:\/\/www.ripe.net\/internet-coordination\/news\/industry-developments\/youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study March 2008. YouTube Hijacking: A RIPE NCC RIS case study. http:\/\/www.ripe.net\/internet-coordination\/news\/industry-developments\/youtube-hijacking-a-ripe-ncc-ris-case-study March 2008."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_12_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2535771.2535787"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_13_2","volume-title":"Adventures in RPKI (non) Deployment. https:\/\/www.nanog.org\/sites\/default\/files\/wednesday_george_adventuresinrpki_62.9.pdf","author":"George W.","year":"2014","unstructured":"W. George . Adventures in RPKI (non) Deployment. https:\/\/www.nanog.org\/sites\/default\/files\/wednesday_george_adventuresinrpki_62.9.pdf , 2014 . NANOG presentation. W. George. Adventures in RPKI (non) Deployment. https:\/\/www.nanog.org\/sites\/default\/files\/wednesday_george_adventuresinrpki_62.9.pdf, 2014. NANOG presentation."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_14_2","volume-title":"Proc. NDSS","author":"Gilad Y.","year":"2016","unstructured":"Y. Gilad , A. Cohen , A. Herzberg , M. Schapira , and H. Shulman . Are we there yet? on RPKI's deployment and security . In Proc. NDSS , 2016 . Y. Gilad, A. Cohen, A. Herzberg, M. Schapira, and H. Shulman. Are we there yet? on RPKI's deployment and security. In Proc. NDSS, 2016."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_15_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2659899"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_16_2","volume-title":"A border gateway protocol 4 (bgp-4). https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc4271","author":"Hares S.","year":"2006","unstructured":"S. Hares , Y. Rekhter , and T. Li . A border gateway protocol 4 (bgp-4). https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc4271 , 2006 . S. Hares, Y. Rekhter, and T. Li. A border gateway protocol 4 (bgp-4). https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc4271, 2006."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_17_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/ICNP.2006.320179"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_18_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/49.839934"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_19_2","volume-title":"BGPSEC protocol specification. https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc8205","author":"Lepinski M.","year":"2015","unstructured":"M. Lepinski . BGPSEC protocol specification. https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc8205 , 2015 . M. Lepinski. BGPSEC protocol specification. https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc8205, 2015."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_20_2","volume-title":"An infrastructure to support secure internet routing. https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc6480","author":"Lepinski M.","year":"2012","unstructured":"M. Lepinski , R. Barnes , and S. Kent . An infrastructure to support secure internet routing. https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc6480 , 2012 . M. Lepinski, R. Barnes, and S. Kent. An infrastructure to support secure internet routing. https:\/\/tools.ietf.org\/html\/rfc6480, 2012."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_21_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2486001.2486010"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_22_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3007208"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_23_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1151659.1159947"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_24_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3211852.3211856"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_25_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"P. Sermpezis V. Kotronis A. Dainotti and X. Dimitropoulos. A survey among network operators on BGP prefix hijacking. arXiv http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1801.02918 2018. P. Sermpezis V. Kotronis A. Dainotti and X. Dimitropoulos. A survey among network operators on BGP prefix hijacking. arXiv http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1801.02918 2018.","DOI":"10.1145\/3211852.3211862"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_26_2","volume-title":"Proc. NSDI","author":"Subramanian L.","year":"2004","unstructured":"L. Subramanian , V. Roth , I. Stoica , S. Shenker , and R. Katz . Listen and whisper: Security mechanisms for bgp . In Proc. NSDI , 2004 . L. Subramanian, V. Roth, I. Stoica, S. Shenker, and R. Katz. Listen and whisper: Security mechanisms for bgp. In Proc. NSDI, 2004."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_27_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.14722\/ndss.2015.23035"}],"container-title":["ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3211852.3211862","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,31]],"date-time":"2022-12-31T19:50:06Z","timestamp":1672516206000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3211852.3211862"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]},"references-count":27,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3211852.3211862"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3211852.3211862","relation":{},"ISSN":["0146-4833"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0146-4833","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2018-04-27","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}