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{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,15]],"date-time":"2024-09-15T00:51:44Z","timestamp":1726361504601},"reference-count":24,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]],"date-time":"2018-04-27T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1524787200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]},"abstract":"A proposal to improve routing security---Route Origin Authorization (ROA)---has been standardized. A ROA specifies which network is allowed to announce a set of Internet destinations. While some networks now specify ROAs, little is known about whether other networks check routes they receive against these ROAs, a process known as Route Origin Validation (ROV). Which networks blindly accept invalid routes? Which reject them outright? Which de-preference them if alternatives exist?<\/jats:p>\n Recent analysis attempts to use uncontrolled experiments to characterize ROV adoption by comparing valid routes and invalid routes. However, we argue that gaining a solid understanding of ROV adoption is impossible using currently available data sets and techniques. Instead, we devise a verifiable methodology of controlled experiments for measuring ROV. Our measurements suggest that, although some ISPs are not observed using invalid routes in uncontrolled experiments, they are actually using different routes for (non-security) traffic engineering purposes, without performing ROV. We conclude with presenting three AS that do implement ROV as confirmed by the operators.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3211852.3211856","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,30]],"date-time":"2018-04-30T11:58:18Z","timestamp":1525089498000},"page":"19-27","update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":35,"title":["Towards a Rigorous Methodology for Measuring Adoption of RPKI Route Validation and Filtering"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"48","author":[{"given":"Andreas","family":"Reuter","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Freie Universit\u00e4t Berlin"}]},{"given":"Randy","family":"Bush","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"IIJ Research \/ Dragon Research"}]},{"given":"Italo","family":"Cunha","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Unversidade Federal de Minas Gerais"}]},{"given":"Ethan","family":"Katz-Bassett","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Columbia University"}]},{"given":"Thomas C.","family":"Schmidt","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"HAW Hamburg"}]},{"given":"Matthias","family":"W\u00e4hlisch","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Freie Universit\u00e4t Berlin"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,4,27]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_2_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2815675.2815712"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_2_1","volume-title":"Pakistan hijacks YouTube \u2013 Renesys Blog. (February","author":"Brown Martin A.","year":"2008","unstructured":"Martin A. Brown . 2008. Pakistan hijacks YouTube \u2013 Renesys Blog. (February 2008 ). http:\/\/www.renesys.com\/blog\/2008\/02\/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1.shtml Martin A. Brown. 2008. Pakistan hijacks YouTube \u2013 Renesys Blog. (February 2008). http:\/\/www.renesys.com\/blog\/2008\/02\/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1.shtml"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"R. Bush R. Austein K. Patel H. Gredler and M. Waehlisch. 2014. Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Router Implementation Report. RFC 7128. IETF. R. Bush R. Austein K. Patel H. Gredler and M. Waehlisch. 2014. Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Router Implementation Report . RFC 7128. IETF.","DOI":"10.17487\/rfc7128"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_4_1","unstructured":"CAIDA. 2012. AS Rank. http:\/\/as-rank.caida.org\/data\/. (2012). CAIDA. 2012. AS Rank. http:\/\/as-rank.caida.org\/data\/. (2012)."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.14722\/ndss.2017.23123"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_6_1","unstructured":"Yossi Gilad Sharon Goldberg and Kotikalapudi Sriram. 2017b. The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI. Internet-Draft \u2013 work in progress 00. IETF. Yossi Gilad Sharon Goldberg and Kotikalapudi Sriram. 2017b. The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI . Internet-Draft \u2013 work in progress 00. IETF."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2659899"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2619239.2626293"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_9_1","volume-title":"Proc. of PAM (LNCS)","author":"Iamartino Daniele","unstructured":"Daniele Iamartino , Cristel Pelsser , and Randy Bush . 2015. Measuring BGP route origin registration validation . In Proc. of PAM (LNCS) . Springer , Berlin , 28\u201340. Daniele Iamartino, Cristel Pelsser, and Randy Bush. 2015. Measuring BGP route origin registration validation. In Proc. of PAM (LNCS). Springer, Berlin, 28\u201340."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2486001.2486036"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_11_1","volume-title":"Reverse Traceroute. In Proc. of NSDI. USENIX.","author":"Katz-Bassett E.","unstructured":"E. Katz-Bassett , H. V. Madhyastha , V. K. Adhikari , J. Sherry C. Scott , P. van Wesep , T. Anderson , and A. Krishnamurthy . 2010 . Reverse Traceroute. In Proc. of NSDI. USENIX. E. Katz-Bassett, H. V. Madhyastha, V. K. Adhikari, J. Sherry C. Scott, P. van Wesep, T. Anderson, and A. Krishnamurthy. 2010. Reverse Traceroute. In Proc. of NSDI. USENIX."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"M. Lepinski and S. Kent. 2012. An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing. RFC 6480. IETF. M. Lepinski and S. Kent. 2012. An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing . RFC 6480. IETF.","DOI":"10.17487\/rfc6480"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_13_1","volume-title":"Proc. of 5th USENIX Workshop CSET. USENIX.","author":"Maennel Olaf","year":"2012","unstructured":"Olaf Maennel , Iain Phillips , Debbie Perouli , Randy Bush , Rob Austein , and Askar Jaboldinov . 2012 . Towards a Framework for Evaluating BGP Security . In Proc. of 5th USENIX Workshop CSET. USENIX. Olaf Maennel, Iain Phillips, Debbie Perouli, Randy Bush, Rob Austein, and Askar Jaboldinov. 2012. Towards a Framework for Evaluating BGP Security. In Proc. of 5th USENIX Workshop CSET. USENIX."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"P. Mohapatra J. Scudder D. Ward R. Bush and R. Austein. 2013. BGP Prefix Origin Validation. RFC 6811. IETF. P. Mohapatra J. Scudder D. Ward R. Bush and R. Austein. 2013. BGP Prefix Origin Validation . RFC 6811. IETF.","DOI":"10.17487\/rfc6811"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_15_1","unstructured":"NIST. 2015. NIST RPKI Deployment Monitor. http:\/\/rpki-monitor.antd.nist.gov\/. (2015). NIST. 2015. NIST RPKI Deployment Monitor. http:\/\/rpki-monitor.antd.nist.gov\/. 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