{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,7,23]],"date-time":"2024-07-23T15:50:57Z","timestamp":1721749857610},"reference-count":45,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,1]],"date-time":"2019-09-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1567296000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/tdm\/userlicense\/1.0\/"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,30]],"date-time":"2020-06-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1593475200000},"content-version":"am","delay-in-days":303,"URL":"http:\/\/www.elsevier.com\/open-access\/userlicense\/1.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001691","name":"Japan Society for the Promotion of Science","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001691","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["elsevier.com","sciencedirect.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Games and Economic Behavior"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,9]]},"DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,6,20]],"date-time":"2019-06-20T23:16:42Z","timestamp":1561072602000},"page":"120-143","update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1016\/elsevier_cm_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":25,"special_numbering":"C","title":["Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility"],"prefix":"10.1016","volume":"117","author":[{"given":"Onur","family":"Kesten","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Morimitsu","family":"Kurino","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0010","series-title":"Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: the Design of New Orlean's Oneapp","author":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2017"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0020","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"399","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.101.1.399","article-title":"Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: the \u201cBoston mechanism\u201d reconsidered","volume":"101","author":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2011","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0030","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.20120027","article-title":"Expanding \u201cchoice\u201d in school choice","volume":"7","author":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2015","journal-title":"Am. Econ. J. Microecon."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0040","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1954","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.99.5.1954","article-title":"Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the NYC high school match","volume":"99","author":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2009","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0050","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"233","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1999.2553","article-title":"House allocation with existing tenants","volume":"88","author":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"1999","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0060","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"729","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157061","article-title":"School choice: a mechanism design approach","volume":"93","author":"Abdulkadiro\u011flu","year":"2003","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0070","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"166","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2016.10.001","article-title":"On the operation of multiple matching markets","volume":"100","author":"Anno","year":"2016","journal-title":"Games Econ. Behav."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0080","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdt021","article-title":"Bargaining and reputation in search markets","volume":"81","author":"Atakan","year":"2014","journal-title":"Rev. Econ. Stud."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0090","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"73","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1998.2469","article-title":"A tale of two mechanisms: student placement","volume":"84","author":"Balinski","year":"1999","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0100","series-title":"The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona","author":"Calsamiglia","year":"2014"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0110","author":"Calsamiglia"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0120","author":"Calsamiglia"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0130","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1086\/701791","article-title":"Efficiency and stability in large matching markets","author":"Che","year":"2019","journal-title":"J. Polit. Econ"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0140","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"99","DOI":"10.1086\/689773","article-title":"Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: a theoretical analysis","volume":"125","author":"Chen","year":"2017","journal-title":"J. Polit. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0150","author":"Combe"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0160","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"485","DOI":"10.1080\/00029890.1981.11995301","article-title":"Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm","volume":"88","author":"Dubins","year":"1981","journal-title":"Am. Math. Mon."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0170","author":"Dur"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0180","author":"Dur"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0190","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1269","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2010.02.007","article-title":"Efficient assignment respecting priorities","volume":"145","author":"Ehlers","year":"2010","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0200","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"146","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2013.11.002","article-title":"Strategy-proof stochastic assignment","volume":"151","author":"Erdil","year":"2014","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0210","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"669","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.98.3.669","article-title":"What's the matter with tie-breaking? Improving efficiency in school choice","volume":"98","author":"Erdil","year":"2008","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0220","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2489","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00383","article-title":"Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities","volume":"70","author":"Ergin","year":"2002","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0230","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"215","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002","article-title":"Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism","volume":"90","author":"Ergin","year":"2006","journal-title":"J. Public Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0240","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"9","DOI":"10.1080\/00029890.1962.11989827","article-title":"College admissions and the stability of marriage","volume":"69","author":"Gale","year":"1962","journal-title":"Am. Math. Mon."},{"issue":"3","key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0250","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1027","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-2354.2012.00710.x","article-title":"Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life mechanism","volume":"53","author":"Guillen","year":"2012","journal-title":"Int. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0260","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"697","DOI":"10.3917\/reco.614.0697","article-title":"Enjeux strat\u00e9giques du concours de recrutement des enseignants-chercheurs","volume":"61","author":"Haeringer","year":"2010","journal-title":"Rev. \u00c9conom."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0270","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1921","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2009.05.002","article-title":"Constrained school choice","volume":"144","author":"Haeringer","year":"2009","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0280","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"325","DOI":"10.3982\/TE1135","article-title":"Effective affirmative action in school choice","volume":"8","author":"Hafalir","year":"2013","journal-title":"Theor. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0290","series-title":"The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choice","author":"Hakimov","year":"2014"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0300","series-title":"Tiers, Preference Similarity, and the Limits on Stable Partners","author":"Kandori","year":"2010"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0310","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"155","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2004.11.001","article-title":"On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems","volume":"127","author":"Kesten","year":"2006","journal-title":"J. Econ. Theory"},{"issue":"3","key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0320","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1297","DOI":"10.1162\/qjec.2010.125.3.1297","article-title":"School choice with consent","volume":"125","author":"Kesten","year":"2010","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0330","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"543","DOI":"10.3982\/TE1558","article-title":"A theory of school-choice lotteries","volume":"10","author":"Kesten","year":"2015","journal-title":"Theor. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0340","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"515","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-013-0769-8","article-title":"The \u2018Boston\u2019 school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach","volume":"55","author":"Kojima","year":"2014","journal-title":"Econ. Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0350","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"107","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.4.4.107","article-title":"Auctions in markets: common outside options and the continuation value effect","volume":"4","author":"Lauermann","year":"2012","journal-title":"Am. Econ. J. Microecon."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0360","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"75","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01242849","article-title":"Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities","volume":"23","author":"Ma","year":"1994","journal-title":"Int. J. Game Theory"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0370","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1636","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.98.4.1636","article-title":"Leveling the playing field: sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism","volume":"98","author":"Pathak","year":"2008","journal-title":"Am. Econ. Rev."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0380","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"617","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.7.4.617","article-title":"The economics of matching: stability and incentives","volume":"7","author":"Roth","year":"1982","journal-title":"Math. Oper. Res."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0390","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"127","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(82)90003-9","article-title":"Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisibilities","volume":"9","author":"Roth","year":"1982","journal-title":"Econ. Lett."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0400","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"131","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(77)90004-0","article-title":"Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods","volume":"4","author":"Roth","year":"1977","journal-title":"J. Math. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0410","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"457","DOI":"10.1162\/0033553041382157","article-title":"Kidney exchange","volume":"119","author":"Roth","year":"2004","journal-title":"Q. J. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0420","series-title":"Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis","author":"Roth","year":"1990"},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0430","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"164","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.5.2.164","article-title":"Assignment of arrival slots","volume":"5","author":"Schummer","year":"2013","journal-title":"Am. Econ. J. Microecon."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0440","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"23","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(74)90033-0","article-title":"On cores and indivisibility","volume":"1","author":"Shapley","year":"1974","journal-title":"J. Math. Econ."},{"key":"10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010_br0450","first-page":"781","article-title":"Matching, allocation, and exchange of discrete resources","volume":"vol. 1A","author":"S\u00f6nmez","year":"2011"}],"container-title":["Games and Economic Behavior"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S089982561930082X?httpAccept=text\/xml","content-type":"text\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/api.elsevier.com\/content\/article\/PII:S089982561930082X?httpAccept=text\/plain","content-type":"text\/plain","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,4,18]],"date-time":"2021-04-18T16:09:52Z","timestamp":1618762192000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/linkinghub.elsevier.com\/retrieve\/pii\/S089982561930082X"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,9]]},"references-count":45,"alternative-id":["S089982561930082X"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010","relation":{},"ISSN":["0899-8256"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0899-8256","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,9]]},"assertion":[{"value":"Elsevier","name":"publisher","label":"This article is maintained by"},{"value":"Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility","name":"articletitle","label":"Article Title"},{"value":"Games and Economic Behavior","name":"journaltitle","label":"Journal Title"},{"value":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.geb.2019.05.010","name":"articlelink","label":"CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version"},{"value":"article","name":"content_type","label":"Content Type"},{"value":"\u00a9 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.","name":"copyright","label":"Copyright"}]}}