乐胖代购免代理版

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We imagine that each player trusts their respective representative\u2019s strategic abilities. Thus, we might imagine that per default, the original players would simply instruct the representatives to play the original game as best as they can. In this paper, we ask: are there safe Pareto improvements on this default way of giving instructions? That is, we imagine that the original players can coordinate to tell their representatives to only consider some subset of the available strategies and to assign utilities to outcomes differently than the original players. Then can the original players do this in such a way that the payoff is guaranteed to be weakly higher than under the default instructions for all the original players? In particular, can they Pareto-improve without probabilistic assumptions about how the representatives play games? In this paper, we give some examples of safe Pareto improvements. We prove that the notion of safe Pareto improvements is closely related to a notion of outcome correspondence between games. We also show that under some specific assumptions about how the representatives play games, finding safe Pareto improvements is NP-complete.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-022-09574-6","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,8,13]],"date-time":"2022-08-13T20:16:56Z","timestamp":1660421816000},"update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game playing"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"36","author":[{"ORCID":"http:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4222-7855","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Caspar","family":"Oesterheld","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Vincent","family":"Conitzer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,8,13]]},"reference":[{"issue":"1","key":"9574_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.2202\/1534-5971.1141","volume":"4","author":"KR Apt","year":"2004","unstructured":"Apt, K. 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