乐胖代购免代理版

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$$ZV$$<\/jats:tex-math>\n \n ZV<\/mml:mi>\n <\/mml:mrow>\n <\/mml:math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula>-line graphs<\/jats:italic>, and show a general facility location mechanism for these graphs that satisfies all these desired properties. This mechanism can also be computed in polynomial time and it can equivalently be defined as the first Pareto-optimal location according to some predefined order. Our main result, the

$$ZV$$<\/jats:tex-math>\n \n ZV<\/mml:mi>\n <\/mml:mrow>\n <\/mml:math><\/jats:alternatives><\/jats:inline-formula>-line graphs family and the mechanism we present for it, unifies all works in the literature of false-name-proof facility location on discrete graphs including the preliminary (unpublished) works we are aware of. In particular, we show mechanisms for all graphs of at most five vertices<\/jats:italic>, discrete trees<\/jats:italic>, bicliques<\/jats:italic>, and clique tree graphs<\/jats:italic>. Finally, we discuss some generalizations and limitations of our result for facility location problems on other structures: Weighted graphs, large discrete cycles, infinite graphs; and for facility location problems concerning infinite societies.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-021-09535-5","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,22]],"date-time":"2022-01-22T07:02:46Z","timestamp":1642834966000},"update-policy":"http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["Manipulation-resistant false-name-proof facility location mechanisms for complex graphs"],"prefix":"10.1007","volume":"36","author":[{"ORCID":"http:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4152-4113","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ilan","family":"Nehama","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"http:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3467-329X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Taiki","family":"Todo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"http:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4929-396X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Makoto","family":"Yokoo","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,22]]},"reference":[{"key":"9535_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Aleskerov, F. 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