{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,10]],"date-time":"2025-02-10T07:10:10Z","timestamp":1739171410452,"version":"3.37.0"},"publisher-location":"New York, NY","reference-count":50,"publisher":"Springer New York","isbn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"9780387758886"},{"type":"electronic","value":"9780387304403"}],"license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2009,1,1]],"date-time":"2009-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1230768000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2009,1,1]],"date-time":"2009-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1230768000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springer.com\/tdm"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2009,1,1]],"date-time":"2009-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1230768000000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"},{"start":{"date-parts":[[2009,1,1]],"date-time":"2009-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1230768000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.springernature.com\/gp\/researchers\/text-and-data-mining"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2009]]},"DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-387-30440-3_241","type":"book-chapter","created":{"date-parts":[[2009,6,17]],"date-time":"2009-06-17T16:55:37Z","timestamp":1245257737000},"page":"4098-4114","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":8,"title":["Game Theory and Strategic Complexity"],"prefix":"10.1007","author":[{"given":"Kalyan","family":"Chatterjee","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Hamid","family":"Sabourian","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","reference":[{"key":"241_CR1_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1259","DOI":"10.2307\/1913097","volume":"56","author":"D Abreu","year":"1988","unstructured":"Abreu D, Rubinstein A (1988) The structure of Nash equilibria in repeated games with finite automata. Econometrica 56:1259\u20131282","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"241_CR2_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"19","DOI":"10.1007\/BF00134103","volume":"29","author":"L Anderlini","year":"1990","unstructured":"Anderlini L (1990) Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games. Theory Decis 29:19\u201352","journal-title":"Theory Decis"},{"key":"241_CR3_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1337","DOI":"10.2307\/2171773","volume":"63","author":"L Anderlini","year":"1995","unstructured":"Anderlini L, Sabourian H (1995) Cooperation and effective computability. Econometrica 63:1337\u20131369","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"241_CR4_241","first-page":"11","volume-title":"Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern","author":"RJ Aumann","year":"1981","unstructured":"Aumann RJ (1981) Survey of repeated games. In: Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim\/Vienna\/Zurich, pp\u00a011\u201342"},{"key":"241_CR5_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(90)90024-O","volume":"2","author":"J Banks","year":"1990","unstructured":"Banks J, Sundaram R (1990) Repeated games, finite automata and complexity. Games Econ Behav 2:97\u2013117","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"241_CR6_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ben Porath E (1986) Repeated games with bounded complexity. Mimeo, Stanford University","DOI":"10.21236\/ADA198447"},{"key":"241_CR7_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"17","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1993.1002","volume":"59","author":"E Ben Porath","year":"1993","unstructured":"Ben Porath E (1993) Repeated games with finite automata. J\u00a0Econ Theory 59:17\u201332","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR8_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"179","DOI":"10.1017\/S0266267100002893","volume":"3","author":"KG Binmore","year":"1987","unstructured":"Binmore KG (1987) Modelling rational players I. Econ Philos 3:179\u2013214","journal-title":"Econ Philos"},{"key":"241_CR9_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"278","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(92)90037-I","volume":"57","author":"KG Binmore","year":"1992","unstructured":"Binmore KG, Samuelson L (1992) Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. J\u00a0Econ Theory 57:278\u2013305","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR10_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"257","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1997.2387","volume":"80","author":"KG Binmore","year":"1998","unstructured":"Binmore KG, Piccione M, Samuelson L (1998) Evolutionary stability in alternating\u2010offers bargaining games. J\u00a0Econ Theory 80:257\u2013291","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR11_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.4159\/harvard.9780674734470","volume-title":"Aesthetic measure","author":"GD Birkhoff","year":"1933","unstructured":"Birkhoff GD (1933) Aesthetic measure. Harvard University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR12_241","unstructured":"Bloise G (1998) Strategic complexity and equilibrium in repeated games. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR13_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"545","DOI":"10.2307\/2171907","volume":"63","author":"L-A Busch","year":"1995","unstructured":"Busch L-A, Wen Q (1995) Perfect equilibria in a\u00a0negotiation model. Econometrica 63:545\u2013565","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"241_CR14_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"223","DOI":"10.1023\/A:1015236512713","volume":"11","author":"K Chatterjee","year":"2002","unstructured":"Chatterjee K (2002) Complexity of strategies and multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Group Decis Negot 11:223\u2013230","journal-title":"Group Decis Negot"},{"key":"241_CR15_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1491","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00169","volume":"68","author":"K Chatterjee","year":"2000","unstructured":"Chatterjee K, Sabourian H (2000) Multiperson bargaining and strategic complexity. Econometrica 68:1491\u20131509","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"241_CR16_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chatterjee K, Sabourian H (2000) N\u2011person bargaining and strategic complexity. Mimeo, University of Cambridge and the Pennsylvania State University","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00169"},{"key":"241_CR17_241","volume-title":"Theory of value","author":"G Debreu","year":"1959","unstructured":"Debreu G (1959) Theory of value. Yale University Press, New Haven\/London"},{"key":"241_CR18_241","first-page":"240","volume":"81","author":"R Fernandez","year":"1991","unstructured":"Fernandez R, Glazer J (1991) Striking for a\u00a0bargain between two completely informed agents. Am Econ Rev 81:240\u2013252","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"241_CR19_241","unstructured":"Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1990) Evolution and repeated games. Mimeo, Harvard\/Princeton"},{"key":"241_CR20_241","volume-title":"Game theory","author":"D Fudenberg","year":"1991","unstructured":"Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR21_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9780511492310","volume-title":"Strategic foundations of general equilibrium: Dynamic matching and bargaining games","author":"D Gale","year":"2000","unstructured":"Gale D (2000) Strategic foundations of general equilibrium: Dynamic matching and bargaining games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR22_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"739","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2005.00595.x","volume":"73","author":"D Gale","year":"2005","unstructured":"Gale D, Sabourian H (2005) Complexity and competition. Econometrica 73:739\u2013770","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"241_CR23_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"336","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2004.11.004","volume":"54","author":"D Gale","year":"2006","unstructured":"Gale D, Sabourian H (2006) Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games. Games Econ Behav 54:336\u2013352","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"241_CR24_241","unstructured":"Gale D, Sabourian H (2008) Complexity and competition II; endogenous matching. Mimeo, New York University\/University of Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR25_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"232","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(90)90077-W","volume":"52","author":"H Haller","year":"1990","unstructured":"Haller H, Holden S (1990) A\u00a0letter to the editor on wage bargaining. J\u00a0Econ Theory 52:232\u2013236","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR26_241","first-page":"519","volume":"35","author":"F Hayek","year":"1945","unstructured":"Hayek F (1945) The use of knowledge in society. Am Econ Rev 35:519\u2013530","journal-title":"Am Econ Rev"},{"key":"241_CR27_241","unstructured":"Herrero M (1985) A\u00a0Strategic theory of market institutions. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics"},{"key":"241_CR28_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"335","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01271130","volume":"20","author":"E Kalai","year":"1992","unstructured":"Kalai E, Neme A (1992) The strength of a\u00a0little perfection. Int J Game Theory 20:335\u2013355","journal-title":"Int J Game Theory"},{"key":"241_CR29_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"397","DOI":"10.2307\/1911078","volume":"56","author":"E Kalai","year":"1988","unstructured":"Kalai E, Stanford W (1988) Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games. Econometrica 56:397\u2013410","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"volume-title":"The economic theory of auctions","year":"2000","key":"241_CR30_241","unstructured":"Klemperer P (ed) (2000) The economic theory of auctions. Elgar, Northampton"},{"key":"241_CR31_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"214","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2006.03.014","volume":"135","author":"J Lee","year":"2007","unstructured":"Lee J, Sabourian H (2007) Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs. J\u00a0Econ Theory 135:214\u2013235","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR32_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"166","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.07.008","volume":"63","author":"E Maenner","year":"2008","unstructured":"Maenner E (2008) Adaptation and complexity in repeated games. Games Econ Behav 63:166\u2013187","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"241_CR33_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"81","DOI":"10.1037\/h0043158","volume":"63","author":"GA Miller","year":"1956","unstructured":"Miller GA (1956) The magical number seven plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity to process information. Psychol Rev 63:81\u201397","journal-title":"Psychol Rev"},{"key":"241_CR34_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"599","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1995.1058","volume":"66","author":"A Neme","year":"1995","unstructured":"Neme A, Quintas L (1995) Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation cost. J\u00a0Econ Theory 66:599\u2013608","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR35_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(85)90026-6","volume":"19","author":"A Neyman","year":"1985","unstructured":"Neyman A (1985) Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely\u2010repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Econ Lett 19:227\u2013229","journal-title":"Econ Lett"},{"key":"241_CR36_241","first-page":"233","volume-title":"NATO ASI Series F","author":"A Neyman","year":"1997","unstructured":"NeymanA (1997) Cooperation, repetition and automata in cooperation:Game\u2010theoretic approaches. In: Hart S, Mas\u2010Colell A (eds)NATO ASI Series F, vol\u00a0155. Springer, Berlin, pp\u00a0233\u2013255"},{"key":"241_CR37_241","volume-title":"Bargaining and markets","author":"M Osborne","year":"1990","unstructured":"OsborneM, Rubinstein A (1990) Bargaining and markets. Academic, New York"},{"key":"241_CR38_241","volume-title":"A course in game theory","author":"M Osborne","year":"1994","unstructured":"Osborne M, Rubinstein A (1994) A\u00a0course in game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR39_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"122","DOI":"10.1016\/0899-8256(92)90008-G","volume":"4","author":"CH Papadimitriou","year":"1992","unstructured":"Papadimitriou CH (1992) On games with a\u00a0bounded number of states. Games Econ Behav 4:122\u2013131","journal-title":"Games Econ Behav"},{"key":"241_CR40_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"180","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(92)90075-S","volume":"56","author":"M Piccione","year":"1992","unstructured":"Piccione M (1992) Finite automata equilibria with discounting. J\u00a0Econ Theory 56:180\u2013193","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR41_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"160","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1993.1063","volume":"61","author":"M Piccione","year":"1993","unstructured":"Piccione M, Rubinstein A (1993) Finite automata play a\u00a0repeated extensive game. J\u00a0Econ Theory 61:160\u2013168","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR42_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/S0022-0531(03)00084-X","volume":"111","author":"A Robson","year":"2003","unstructured":"Robson A (2003) The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen. J\u00a0Econ Theory 111:1\u201322","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR43_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531","volume":"50","author":"A Rubinstein","year":"1982","unstructured":"Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a\u00a0bargaining model. Econometrica 50:97\u2013109","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"key":"241_CR44_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"83","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(86)90021-9","volume":"39","author":"A Rubinstein","year":"1986","unstructured":"Rubinstein A (1986) Finite automata play the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. J\u00a0Econ Theory 39:83\u201396","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR45_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/4702.001.0001","volume-title":"Modeling bounded rationality","author":"A Rubinstein","year":"1998","unstructured":"Rubinstein A (1998) Modeling bounded rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge"},{"key":"241_CR46_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"63","DOI":"10.2307\/2297543","volume":"57","author":"A Rubinstein","year":"1990","unstructured":"Rubinstein A, Wolinsky A (1990) Decentralized trading, strategic behaviour and the Walrasian outcome. Rev Econ Stud 57:63\u201378","journal-title":"Rev Econ Stud"},{"key":"241_CR47_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"189","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2003.08.003","volume":"116","author":"H Sabourian","year":"2003","unstructured":"Sabourian H (2003) Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome. J\u00a0Econ Theory 116:189\u2013228","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"},{"key":"241_CR48_241","first-page":"201","volume":"12","author":"R Selten","year":"1965","unstructured":"Selten R (1965) Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetr\u00e4gheit. Z gesamte Staatswiss 12:201\u2013324","journal-title":"Z gesamte Staatswiss"},{"key":"241_CR49_241","unstructured":"ShakedA (1986) A\u00a0three\u2010person unanimity game. In: The Los Angelesnational meetings of the Institute of Management Sciences and theOperations Research Society of America, Mimeo, University of Bonn"},{"key":"241_CR50_241","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(89)90065-3","volume":"49","author":"E Zemel","year":"1989","unstructured":"Zemel E (1989) Small talk and cooperation: A\u00a0note on bounded rationality. J\u00a0Econ Theory 49:1\u20139","journal-title":"J Econ Theory"}],"container-title":["Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1007\/978-0-387-30440-3_241","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,2,10]],"date-time":"2025-02-10T05:59:13Z","timestamp":1739167153000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/10.1007\/978-0-387-30440-3_241"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2009]]},"ISBN":["9780387758886","9780387304403"],"references-count":50,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-0-387-30440-3_241","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2009]]}}}