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. 2021 Nov 13;23(11):1508.
doi: 10.3390/e23111508.

Analysis of Electromagnetic Information Leakage Based on Cryptographic Integrated Circuits

Shaofei Sun  1 , Hongxin Zhang  1 , Xiaotong Cui  1 , Qiang Li  1 , Liang Dong  1   2 , Xing Fang  1
Affiliations

Analysis of Electromagnetic Information Leakage Based on Cryptographic Integrated Circuits

Shaofei Sun et al. Entropy (Basel). .

Abstract

Cryptographic algorithm is the most commonly used method of information security protection for many devices. The secret key of cryptographic algorithm is usually stored in these devices' registers. In this paper, we propose an electromagnetic information leakage model to investigate the relationship between the electromagnetic leakage signal and the secret key. The registers are considered as electric dipole models to illustrate the source of the electromagnetic leakage. The equivalent circuit of the magnetic field probe is developed to bridge the output voltage and the electromagnetic leakage signal. Combining them, the electromagnetic information leakage model's function relationship can be established. Besides, an electromagnetic leakage model based on multiple linear regression is proposed to recover the secret key and the model's effectiveness is evaluated by guess entropy. Near field tests are conducted in an unshielded ordinary indoor environment to investigate the electromagnetic side-channel information leakage. The experiment result shows the correctness of the proposed electromagnetic leakage model and it can be used to recover the secret key of the cryptographic algorithm.

Keywords: electromagnetic leakage; electromagnetic side-channel analysis; guess entropy; integrated circuits; multiple linear regression.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
Experiment Platform.
Figure 2
Figure 2
Hardware Implementation of AES.
Figure 3
Figure 3
One of the measured electromagnetic trace.
Figure 4
Figure 4
The main process of electromagnetic leakage process.
Figure 5
Figure 5
The CMOS Inverter.
Figure 6
Figure 6
The Electric Dipole.
Figure 7
Figure 7
The Equivalent Circuit for Magnetic Probe.
Figure 8
Figure 8
The determination coefficient of different key candidates.
Figure 9
Figure 9
The p value of different key candidates.
Figure 10
Figure 10
The relationship between determination coefficient and trace number.
Figure 11
Figure 11
The guess entropy of the proposed model in different trace number.
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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